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1 ABSTRACT 
Given a low-entropy past state, statistical mechanics purportedly explains the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. Modern cosmology furnishes this account with a low-entropy early universe. 
However, what explains this past state? One approach simply postulates this initial condition as a 
contingent fact or law. Alternatively, one can seek a dynamical solution. This paper assesses the 
explanatory efficacy some popular proposals. In particular, Carroll's multiverse hypothesis is 
critiqued and shown to be subject to similar problems faced by Boltzmann. 
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3 INTRODUCTION 
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, 
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. 
All the king's horses and all the king's men 
Couldn't put Humpty together again. 
 
Some elements of our experience are so deeply intuitive that they appear to be brute facts about the 
world. Science has a habit of disabusing us of such intuitions. Notably, in the twentieth century the 
advent of special and general relativity assailed Newtonian notions of absolute time and space; and 
quantum mechanics undermined a deeply held scientific presumption of locality. In this story, 
however, science is on our side, defending our profound intuition that the direction of time is 
something immutable and that the time asymmetries observed in the unfolding of physical 
processes reveal an inherent feature of the universe. The vast majority of processes in the world are 
irreversible. We remain unsurprised upon witnessing any number of eggs breaking, but never 
expect to see an egg spontaneously un-break. If we observe an ice-cube melt in warm water, we do 
not attribute this to coincidence or chance, but rather to some natural necessity. No evidence 
refutes these intuitions. 
 
Yet there exists a dissonance between the kind of observable macroscopic phenomena described 
above and the microscopic theories that, in principle, should account for those phenomena: namely, 
the former are manifestly irreversible and the latter, apparently, are not. While our everyday 
experience of the world is inviolably time-asymmetric1, all our fundamental dynamical laws to 
date—then (Newtonian) and arguably2 now (quantum mechanics, general relativity, string theory, 
etc.)—are time-symmetric. They exhibit no appreciable or relevant time-directedness. How can 
science explain this obvious disparity between the fundamental laws and our everyday experience 
of the world? 
 
The broad problem of time-asymmetry per se is not our quarry here, but rather a particular 
problem that arises from a microscopic account of physical processes. For over 150 years, both 
                                                          
1 This one-way behavior of macroscopic physical processes is often called the "arrow of time." And this asymmetry can be 
divided into three types (a la Albert (2000)): physical processes (e.g., we grow older), epistemic access (e.g., we have 
knowledge of the past in a way we do not have of the future) and agency (e.g., we cannot change the past). This paper 
addresses only physical processes. 
2 Some interpretations of quantum mechanics (notably, Copenhagen) allow for wave function collapses. Collapses 
introduce time-asymmetries. However, such collapses are not entailed by the axioms of quantum mechanics. Further, it is 
not obvious how such collapses could account for the time-asymmetries we are concerned with here. See Albert (2000) 
and Callender (2011) for further discussion. 
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physicist and philosopher have enlisted in attempts to confirm the veracity of our intuition with 
respect to time: to explain how patently time-asymmetric phenomena supervene on the 
fundamental laws, which neither proscribe time-symmetric processes nor prescribe time-
asymmetric processes. The general approach has been to focus on the Second Law of 
thermodynamics—the ineluctable increase of entropy—as the source of this asymmetry in nature. 
Such explanations commonly focus on the relationship between thermodynamics—which 
embodies the irreversibility of macroscopic processes—and statistical mechanics—which attempts 
to underwrite thermodynamics with contemporaneous fundamental dynamical laws. While 
thermodynamics provides a simple and definitive law that entails asymmetric macroscopic physical 
processes, much of the program of statistical mechanics concerns the recovery of this asymmetry.3 
 
Statistical mechanics is often lauded as a paradigmatic example of theory reduction, purportedly 
offering a microscopic explanation of thermodynamic phenomena. However, statistical mechanics 
simpliciter is unable to account for a simple yet subtle and oft overlooked problem that lies at its 
foundations: explaining the requisite low-entropy past state of the universe. 
 
Equipped with a low-entropy initial condition and a fundamental analogue to the Second Law (such 
as the Boltzmannian statistical mechanics reviewed in this paper), one can arguably4 capture 
nature’s abovementioned asymmetries. But this is not so easy to justify. Can a low-entropy state at 
the early-universe recover the necessary thermodynamic asymmetries? And does the positing of a 
contingent boundary condition count as a satisfactory explanation? 150 years of discourse and 
deliberation have failed to secure a consensus—though progress has been made and some 
potentially tractable ideas propounded. This paper rehearses key arguments pertinent to this low-
entropy problem and assesses potential solutions. While necessarily selective, the hope is that 
comparing and contrasting disparate claims made on this unresolved topic will admit some 
clarification. In particular, two opposing approaches to our explanandum are rehearsed and 
assessed: the Past Hypothesis (à la Albert et al.) and the multiverse (originally proposed by 
Carroll). The paper ultimately concludes that the plague of problems visited upon the multiverse 
preclude its candidacy as explanans. Yet the Past Hypothesis, while meeting many of the criteria of a 
scientific law, offers little in terms of explanation. It is hoped that new physics may help resolve this 
issue. 
 
This paper approaches the low-entropy problem by first rehearsing relevant historical steps in the 
discovery and definition of entropy. While this history is well documented, many of these early 
                                                          
3 Sklar (1998) observes: "Since the middle of the nineteenth century, there has been a continual program in physics 
designed to show that thermodynamics itself can be reduced to, and explained in terms of, a deeper understanding of the 
world" (4-5). But this has been "continuously thwarted by the seeming necessity, at ever deeper levels, of invoking some 
hypotheses that remain underivable from the fundamental laws of kinematics or dynamics" (5). 
4 Whether this is indeed the case is the subject of this paper and is discussed at length below. 
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ideas and arguments remain relevant in assessing and informing contemporary debates. In Chapter 
4, the story unfolds with a review of some key elements of thermodynamics. The laws of 
thermodynamics remain important in describing the time-asymmetric nature of our world. Any 
valuation of statistical mechanics minimally requires faithful reproduction of thermodynamic 
behavior5 (up to a certain limit of granularity). Further, it is difficult to empirically verify many of 
the claims of statistical mechanics due to the complex calculations involved in most non-trivial 
scenarios. For all practical purposes, statistical mechanics depends upon the approximate yet 
robust validity of thermodynamics for experimental verification. Statistical mechanics cannot be 
entirely divorced from thermodynamics. 
 
Chapter 5 turns to Boltzmann's microscopic account of thermodynamics. Boltzmann is only one of 
the early protagonists in this story, but his approach and ideas serve as an historical focus. Much of 
the early debate centered on the viability of Boltzmann’s reduction of thermodynamics to a more 
fundamental theory. While this debate continues today, Boltzmann arguably succeeded in much of 
what he set out to achieve and laid solid foundations upon which the field of statistical mechanics 
has developed. 
 
Statistical mechanics provides a broader and more accurate description of the world, but it also 
introduces new complexity and new problems. One of these problems, introduces in Chapter 6, is 
explaining our low-entropy past. A statistical mechanical explanation of a low-entropy past entails 
potentially paradoxical conclusions. For instance, by introducing probability, the problem of 
explaining a low-entropy past becomes more pronounced. Attempts to circumvent these 
conclusions necessitates a deeply thought-provoking reevaluation of fundamental assumptions of 
space and time. 
 
Modern cosmology, based upon a combination of empirical evidence and the theoretical claims of 
general relativity, Big Bang theory, quantum mechanics and the Standard Model of elementary 
particles, has the potential to explain the low-entropy conundrum. To this end, Chapter 7 
introduces modern cosmology pertinent to our topic. Specifically, the consequences of general 
relativity combined with astronomical discoveries, such as the Cosmic Microwave Background 
(CMB), have led to a detailed picture of the early universe only a fraction of a second after what is 
nebulously termed the Big Bang. This empirical data appears to indicate the universe was in a state 
of very low entropy 14 billion years ago. But why is the entropy of the observable universe 
ostensibly far lower than a naïve interpretation of statistical mechanics predicts? 
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Initially proposed in primitive form by Boltzmann, the idea of setting a low-entropy boundary 
condition (suitably located around the time of the Big Bang) is a popular response today. This 
condition, commonly referred to as the Past Hypothesis, is supposed to account for the patent time-
asymmetric phenomena we observe in the world. Chapter 8 turns to the application of this Past 
Hypothesis in explaining the behavior of eggs and such. The original idea has been radically 
elaborated by contemporary thinkers (e.g., Albert6), following the dramatic course of science during 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which offers new insights, proposes new solutions and 
unveils new problems.  
 
However, to date, deeper knowledge of the universe seems better at revealing our ignorance of the 
true nature of entropy and exposing the limitations of the standard version of statistical mechanics. 
There are numerous objections to these proposals and numerous details that remain problematic. 
This paper critiques a selection of arguments with regard to the applicability and success of 
statistical mechanics and modern theories to explain the Second Law. Chapter 9 addresses a 
number of concerns with the above Past Hypothesis. Not least, how the successful statistical-
mechanical predictions of gases in boxes extend to cosmic scales where gravity is the dominant 
force. 
 
Another approach to our problem is to invoke some dynamical explanation whereby the low-
entropy condition somehow arises “naturally.” Whether or not this works involves a great deal of 
speculation and new science. Chapter 10 assesses an alternative account, proposed by Sean Carroll. 
Carroll (2011) argues, firstly, that “we don’t know what the unobservable part of the universe looks 
like.” Secondly, he asserts the possibility that “the universe extends infinitely far, but conditions 
vary wildly from place to place.” This is what Carroll calls a multiverse, comprising innumerable 
pocket universes, each with its own special initial conditions. He argues that this can account for the 
low-entropy observed at the early universe. 
 
The low-entropy problem is fascinating because it highlights an asymmetry in our world that we 
have yet to capture with our best fundamental physical theories. It tackles, head-on, some deep 
problems in our understanding of time’s direction. Some of the proposed solutions of the low-
entropy problem challenge received definitions of explanation. Chapter 11 assesses the above 
proposed accounts with regard to their explanatory import, asking: what counts as a good scientific 
explanation? Can the low-entropy state of the early universe be explained as a “natural” 
consequence of dynamical processes? Or, is it sufficient merely to posit the Past Hypothesis as a 
law-like contingent fact about our universe? 
 
                                                          
6 See, in particular, Time and Chance (Albert 2000). 
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I conclude that the statistical-mechanical program, while still struggling with many technical and 
conceptual difficulties, is capable of delivering a reasonable, consistent and sufficient explanation of 
our low-entropy past. Of course, new physics may resolve or even dissolve this problem. Until such 
time, however, care should be taken in positing more than is required to deliver a coherent picture. 
  
Miles Dawborne   Explaining Low Entropy  
MA Thesis 2014  12 of 75 
4 THE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS 
“Nature's most reliable law” 
— Carroll (2011 32) 
 
Thermodynamics is the study of heat and its relation to other macroscopic properties. The 
simplicity of the laws7 that constrain the behavior of thermodynamic systems belie their power and 
scope—we can be as sure of the Second Law as of any scientific claim. Yet, it is important to 
understand the assumptions made when applying these laws and the domain of their application. 
This section makes clear those limitations, while highlighting the importance of thermodynamics in 
delimiting and defending any more fundamental description of the world. 
 
4.1 CARNOT'S ENGINE 
Nicolas Leonard Sadi Carnot is famous for his work on reversible thermodynamic processes—in 
particular, steam engines. He was interested in how to maximize the amount of mechanical energy 
produced by such engines. In brief, Carnot conceived of an ideal reversible8 thermodynamic 
process: the Carnot engine. He showed9 that the efficiency of such an engine is simply a function of 
the temperatures of the hot and cold heat reservoirs. This delimits the efficiency of any engine, as is 
summarized in Carnot's theorem: 
No engine operating between two heat reservoirs can be more efficient than a Carnot 
engine operating between the same reservoirs. 
 
By prescribing an absolute limit to the amount of useful energy (or, work) one can extract from any 
engine, Carnot had discovered something about the nature of energy beyond the First Law.  
 
                                                          
7 To review: The First Law concerns itself with the internal energy of a thermodynamic system. This quantity is 
conserved. The First Law does not prescribe a direction to the evolution of a thermodynamic system—it allows all 
processes to be reversible. The Second Law concerns itself with another property of a thermodynamic system: entropy. 
This quantity is not conserved (for all practical purposes). The Second Law is proscriptive, disallowing reversibility for 
most processes. 
8 A process is reversible just in case the system is in thermodynamic equilibrium with its surroundings throughout the 
process. That is, a process where no heat is lost from the system. In practice, reversible processes are impossible, as they 
would require infinite time. However, for many processes, this is an adequate approximation. 
9 See Appendix. 
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4.2 CLAUSIUS ENTROPY 
Developing the work of Carnot, Rudolf Clausius uncovered a new state property constraining 
thermodynamic systems.10 This property Clausius coined entropy: a measure of energy that cannot 
be corralled into work. Further, he formulated the relation between entropy change, dS, and heat, 
𝛿𝑄, for a given absolute temperature, T: 





In other words, for a quasi-static process in a thermally isolated system, there is no entropy change. 
For any other process in a thermally isolated11 system, entropy increases.12 This discovery was 
followed by a deeper insight, elevated to physical law: the Second Law of thermodynamics. There 
are plenty of ways to express this law, but a common version states: 
For any isolated system, entropy never decreases. 
 
This constraint on thermodynamic systems has broad implications. The Second Law encompasses 
the discovery that energy can be described by its quality or utility: entropy is a quantitative 
measure of the amount of useless energy of a system; or, a measure of the energy unavailable for 
useful work. And the Second Law constrains the behavior of any isolated macroscopic physical 
system with the prescription that the quality of its energy always tends to degrade. 
 
4.3 THE LIMITS OF THERMODYNAMICS 
One of the great scientific achievements of the nineteenth century, the laws of thermodynamics 
describe an enormous breadth of phenomena. These concise and elegant laws have stood the test of 
time and remain relevant today, despite subsequent twentieth century revolutions in science. 
Indeed, the principles these laws underwrite count among the most fundamental that physicists 
agree upon. "Within its domain," remarks Callender (2004), "there has not been a single exception 
found to its principal laws" (241). The Second Law underwrites an apparently exceptionless 
regularity. It is important in understanding such diverse fields as information theory and black 
holes, suggesting entropy is a deep and irreducible feature of our world. Most notably, the Second 
Law encapsulates the time-irreversible nature of spontaneous processes—a patent feature of the 
world that more fundamental theories (arguably) fail to capture. 
                                                          
10 See Appendix for further details. 
11 This law strictly applies to isolated systems. It does not offer counsel on systems that are not isolated, which is a good 
thing because examples abound of violations of entropy increase (from the function of a refrigerator to life itself). 
12 Note that, like energy and volume, entropy is an extensive quality. That is, it is additive when combining systems: the 
total entropy is the sum of those systems. This is in contrast to intensive properties, such as temperature and pressure. 
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However, it is also important not to overlook the limitations of these thermodynamic regularities. 
Thermodynamics is concerned only with equilibrium13 states of a system. The system constraints 
that supervene on the thermodynamic laws (for instance, the Ideal Gas Law, which expresses the 
relationship between pressure, temperature and volume for an ideal gas) depend on the 
assumption of equilibrium.14 Those constraints no longer apply when the system significantly 
deviates from equilibrium.15 The reason for this is nicely captured by Callender (2001): 
"Thermodynamics is essentially a system of relationships (i.e., equations of state) 
among the macroscopic parameters of a system at equilibrium. A system is in thermal 
equilibrium just in case these parameters are approximately constant" (4). 
 
As Clausius' formulation highlights, entropy (along with the other state variables) is only calculable 
at, or close to, equilibrium. This presents a technical problem describing non-equilibrium systems 
and a puzzle explaining why such systems are ubiquitous, given the Second Law. Furthermore, 
thermodynamics cannot account for microscopic fluctuations. And yet this phenomenon has been 
experimentally confirmed.16 So, the theory is not empirically adequate in the strictest sense. 
 
There is also much disagreement over the domain where thermodynamics applies. It is not clear, 
for example, if thermodynamics can be extended to truly cosmological scales, where the effects of 
gravity can no longer be ignored. 
 
Finally, for all their utility, the laws of thermodynamics lack explanatory power. Entropy has proven 
particularly difficult to explain. Whence comes the “useful” (or, “free”17) energy and whither does it 
                                                          
13 Thermodynamic equilibrium: Consider two systems brought together. Equilibrium when all intensive variables (T, P) 
equal. Two systems are in thermal equilibrium when their temperatures are the same. Two systems are in mechanical 
equilibrium when their pressures are the same. Two systems are in diffusive equilibrium when their chemical potentials 
are the same. 
14 According to Tisza (1966): “If an isolated system is not in equilibrium, we cannot associate an entropy with it” (41). 
15 Non-equilibrium thermodynamics has been developed, but the relations are no longer simple. 
16 Of course, at macroscopic scales this is not a problem. This is called the thermodynamic limit. See, for instance, Wang, et 
al. (2002).  
17 Free energy is defined as the amount of thermodynamic energy available for work. Work refers to forms of energy 
transfer that change external macroscopic physical constraints on the system. Mechanical work, for example, might be the 
energy expended in volume expansion against an external force. Or, for constant pressure, P, the work, W, to expand 
system volume, dV, can be expressed as: W = PdV. In contrast, heat is energy transferred from one system to another (via 
conduction, convection or radiation). Work can be entirely converted into heat; but one can only partially convert heat 
into work. 
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go once it’s spent of work? How is the quality of certain energy transformed into lower quality 
heat? Why is the gradient directed in one direction? 
 
Such questions motivated Robert Maxwell, Ludwig Boltzmann, et al., to search for a more 
fundamental theory. A microscopic theory to underwrite the empirically demonstrable macroscopic 
phenomena describes by thermodynamics. This project met with qualified success, but not without 
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5 STATISTICAL MECHANICS 
"You cannot stir things apart" 
—Stoppard (1993 12) 
 
The positing of atoms was controversial during the nineteenth century. Yet, by the turn of the 
twentieth century, this microscopic description of the world was generally accepted18 and the 
problem of reducing thermodynamics became all the more urgent. Not least because the 
demonstrable irreversibility found in thermodynamics is ostensibly absent from more fundamental 
laws of physics. Loewer (2012a) offers a canonical example: 
"[S]ince the melting of ice cubes (i.e., the motions of particles constituting an ice cube realizing 
its melting) in warm water is compatible with the laws then so is the spontaneous formation of 
an ice cube out of warm water. The latter process violates the second law since it is entropy 
decreasing" (124). 
 
In other words, while macroscopic evolution towards the past is patently more restrictive than it is 
towards the future, the underlying microscopic dynamics exhibit no such temporal asymmetry. 
 
The challenge then is to explain entropy increase at the microscopic level. Maxwell and Boltzmann 
were first to face this challenge in the middle of the nineteenth century, which resulted in the 
development of statistical mechanics. As previously mentioned, the laws of thermodynamics 
describe experimentally verifiable regularities for a class of systems, completely defined by a set of 
macroscopic properties. The project of statistical mechanics is to account for the behavior of 
macroscopic thermodynamic systems by postulating the statistical behavior of its innumerable 
microscopic constituents. The hope is that thermodynamic phenomena emerge from this 
microscopic description. A reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is successful just 
in case the microscopic description adequately captures and explains the emergence of 
macroscopic regularities.  
 
There are now various approaches to statistical mechanics. 19 While each approach has its pros and 
cons, this section follows Boltzmann, rehearsing ideas and assumptions that remain relevant today. 
                                                          
18 During his annus marabilis, Einstein (1905) published a paper on Brownian motion in fluids. Before this paper, atoms 
were recognized as a useful concept, but physicists and chemists hotly debated whether atoms were real entities. 
19 Sklar (1998) warns, "statistical mechanics presents us not with a single, well-formulated and easily presented theory, 
but, rather, with something of a hodgepodge of approaches, formulations, and schools" and "there exists no single, 
coherent, and clear understanding as to just what the theory of statistical mechanics is or ought to be" (5). 
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The focus is on Newtonian dynamics (as is common in these discussions) for reasons of simplicity 
and familiarity. However, these arguments translate, more or less, over to more modern theories, 
such as standard quantum mechanics and QFT. None of these theories entail any appreciable 
preferred direction to physical processes. 
 
5.1 BOLTZMANN 
Boltzmann developed a mechanical account of thermodynamics that reduces properties such as 
heat and temperature and pressure to the behavior of enormous numbers unobservable particles. 
As the dynamics of a Newtonian system of more than just a few bodies soon becomes 
mathematically intractable, any attempt to describe the motions of billions of particles (which 
would be the case for even the smallest macroscopic object) must take a different approach. One of 
Boltzmann's achievements was to make some prima facie reasonable assumptions about how such 
particles would move and interact and produce a set of predictions about how such a system would 
behave macroscopically. What emerges is statistical mechanics, a thermodynamic model that makes 
probabilistic predictions. This statistical approach introduces powerful new predictions, but it also 
generates a dissonance between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics that is the source of a 
number of very deep problems of how fundamental laws can account for the directedness of time. 
This raises a set of apparent paradoxes, noted later, that remain largely problematic. However, 
progress has been made, as we shall see. 
 
The history and evolution of these ideas is convoluted and modern nomenclature confused. In fact, 
Boltzmann made several attempts at developing statistical mechanics and expended considerable 
effort addressing the above concerns. So, it will be instructive to delineate these different 
approaches in order to separate out concerns. 
 
5.2 H-THEOREM 
Thermodynamic systems can be described with only a few state variables (e.g., volume, pressure, 
temperature). This is especially fortunate, as a typical thermodynamic system comprises an 
enormous number of particles, of the order of Avagadro’s number (6.02 x 1023). A full description of 
such a system would demand evaluation of over 1023 degrees of freedom. This is impractical. 
However, careful application of statistical inference can greatly simplify the task. Maxwell had 
shown20 that a gas at equilibrium comprises a particular probabilistic distribution of velocities of its 
constituent particles. In a paper published in 1872, Boltzmann introduced his kinetic theory, now 
referred to as H-theorem, offering a statistical description of the behavior of an ideal gas. 
                                                          
20 See Appendix for more details. 
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H-theorem describes the thermodynamic behavior of a dilute gas by considering the interactions 
(collisions) of its constituent particles. Boltzmann aimed to prove that an isolated, dilute gas in an 
arbitrary initial state, monotonically tends toward equilibrium. Or to be more specific, given any 
initial velocity distribution, such a system would approach the state described by the Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution21. 
 
The embodiment of this theorem is Boltzmann's transport equation, describing the rate of change 
of energy density, f(q,p), where q is the position vector and p is the momentum vector: 
𝑑𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝)
𝑑𝑡
 =  [
𝑑𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝)
𝑑𝑡
] 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 + [
𝑑𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝)
𝑑𝑡





This equation22 thus describes energy dispersion over time. The equilibrium distribution should be 
stationary, i.e., it should not change shape as a result of the continual collisions between the 
particles. 
 
Boltzmann availed himself of some assumptions in order to make his calculations23 more tractable. 
Specifically, he dispensed with the external and position terms above by: 
 ignoring the effects of external forces; 
 assuming the particles to be homogeneously spread throughout the system at all times. 
 
To achieve the desired result, Boltzmann also made some assumptions with regard to the 
remaining collision term. He assumed: 
 momentum isotropy (no preferred direction of velocity); 
 the system to be sufficiently dilute that only binary collision need be considered; 
 Boundaries to be insignificant: essentially assuming that a system is large enough to ignore 
interactions at the boundaries; 
 Interactions of particles to be essentially elastic; 
                                                          
21 The actual statistical distribution depends on the type of particles that comprise the system. Depending on their 
properties, equilibrium state can assume Maxwell–Boltzmann, Fermi–Dirac or Bose–Einstein distributions. 
22 Boltzmann’s transport equation successfully predicts entropic increase for many domains. It remains useful in making 
calculations and various modified versions of the theorem are employed by physicists today. More recently, attempts 
have been made to generalize this equation. However, it is not at all obvious that such attempts hold at cosmological 
scales or under conditions of the early universe. 
23 See Appendix for more on H-theorem. 
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 Particles are not correlated before collisions. 
 
This last assumption, known as Stoßzahlansatz (or, molecular chaos), is famously challenged (as we 
shall see below).  
 
Given the above assumptions, Boltzmann demonstrates that this system has a unique equilibrium 
state, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, at a local minimum, i.e., when: 
𝑑𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝)
𝑑𝑡
 =  0 
 
Defining: 
𝐻 = ∭ 𝑑𝑞 ∭ 𝑑𝑝 𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝) 
 
where f(q, p) is the energy density function of the system, as mentioned above, he shows24 that: 
dH
dt
≤  0 
 
So, H never increases. For a given system, H decreases monotonically until it reaches equilibrium 





Boltzmann further postulates that this property, H, is negatively associated with thermodynamic 
entropy, S. (Or, S = -H.) He thus recovers the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
 
5.3 PROBLEMS WITH H-THEOREM 
Given the above assumptions, H-theorem demonstrates the inexorable increase of entropy until it 
reaches a maximum (of which the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is the unique solution). 
                                                          
24 See Appendix for details of proof. 
Miles Dawborne   Explaining Low Entropy  
MA Thesis 2014  20 of 75 
However, as Maxwell highlights with his eponymous demon25, this approach cannot be entirely 
correct. 
 
Indeed, it turns out that the Stoßzahlansatz assumption breaks time reversal symmetry in a subtle 
sense, and therefore begs the question. It foists time-asymmetry into the equation by asserting 
correlation after but not before collisions (that is, by choosing initial, rather than the final particle 
velocities in the collision calculations). This unpalatable assumption contributed to the demise of H-
theorem as an adequate reduction of thermodynamics. What should have been obvious from the 
start is that expecting time-asymmetric behavior to emerge from underlying time-symmetric 
Newtonian mechanics is bound to fail. Whatever microscopic explanation is devised, a time-
asymmetric assumption is necessary to reproduce the desired Second Law dynamics. As Price 
(1996) remarks, "the H-theorem has its eyes set to the future, while all the interesting action is 
actually in the past" (40). 
 
5.4 COMBINATORICS 
Accepting the abovementioned criticism of his H-theorem, Boltzmann came to recognize that any 
purely mechanical account cannot guarantee approach to equilibrium. Given that the microscopic 
dynamics are invariant under time-reversal, there are motions of gas particles whose behavior does 
not conspire to produce this result. According to the microscopic dynamics, spontaneous decrease 
in entropy is theoretically possible. To be sure, empirical adequacy demands that such behavior is 
relegated to the extreme margins of probability. Nonetheless, this idea led Boltzmann to develop a 
very different account of the Second Law, one that requires no assumptions about particle 
collisions. Exploiting the fact that an observable macroscopic thermodynamic state can be 
equivalently realized by multiple microscopic states, Boltzmann employed an ingenious 
combinatorial argument to recover a quantitative definition of thermodynamic entropy. In other 
words, Boltzmann constructed a probabilistic version of the Second Law. 
 
5.4.1 Microstates and macrostates 
The microscopic state (or, microstate) of a system captures the position and momentum of each of 
the molecules comprising the system. An exhaustive classical26 description of the dynamic state of a 
system of N molecules requires knowledge of its 6N degrees of freedom. A macrostate is a coarse-
grained description of the system, characterized by a much smaller number of constraints. For 
instance, a thermodynamic description of the system is simply a function of the normal gross 
constraints of volume, pressure, temperature. A macrostate is thus compatible with a large family of 
similar microstates. Macrostates supervene on microstates. While a microstate is always associated 
                                                          
25 A good place to start for a history of Maxwell’s demon is Earman, J. & Norton, J. (1998). 
26 Boltzmann based his microscopic description of a system on Newtonian mechanics. 
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with only one macrostate, the converse is not necessarily true. Put another way, while a change in 
the macrostate entails some change in the microstate, the opposite does not normally hold. 
 
5.4.2 Boltzmann entropy 
The precise microstate of a system of N molecules can be represented abstractly as a set of points 
on a 6-dimensional µ-space or a single point on a 6N-dimensional phase-space27. The state space of 
a classical system comprises an infinite number of possible microstates. To make calculations 
tractable, Boltzmann employs a method known as coarse-graining: partitioning similar sets of 
microstates into volumes (or, cells) on the state space. At a certain level of granularity, delimited by 
the volume measure,28 a set of microstates produce indistinguishable macroscopic measurements. 
For instance, swapping the actual microstate for another possible microstate in the same cell 
induces no apparent (i.e., measureable) change to the system at the macroscopic level.29 Defining a 
distribution as an assignment of molecules to cells, it is identified with a unique macroscopic state 
of the system. In general, there are many arrangements compatible with a particular distribution. 
 
To offer a simple example, consider a box comprising N = 2 identical molecules. Assume that a 
molecule may be found in either the left or right side of the box. The system thus has 3 accessible 
macrostates: both molecules on the left side; both on the right side; and an even distribution. 
Extending this to N = 10 molecules, there are now N + 1 = 11 accessible macrostates and 2N = 1024 
microstates (or, arrangements). For instance, the box may be found in a state with 1 molecule on 
the left side, and 9 molecules on the right side. In this case, there are 10 different arrangements 
compatible with this distribution. In general, the number of arrangements (or, multiplicity) 
associated with a particular state (or, distribution) is given by the following formula: 
WN,n = N!/n!(N-n)! 
 
So, the multiplicity for half the molecules being on each side is: 
W10,5 = 10!/5!(10-5)! = 252 
 
Exploiting this subtle relationship between the number of arrangements of particles compatible 
with a distribution and its associated phase-space volume, Boltzmann recovers a quantitative 
                                                          
27 See Appendix for a description of µ-space and phase-space. NB: In quantum mechanics, the state space is defined over 
Hilbert space. 
28 The Lebesgue measure is the standard extension to the normal 3-dimensional volume measure. See Appendix for 
further discussion. 
29 "Slightly changing the position of one proton in your shoe," Callender (2004) explains, "will not alter the temperature of 
the shoe" (242). 
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definition of entropy. Consider, for instance, an ideal gas of N identical molecules with total energy 
U contained in volume V. Roughly, Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument proceeds as follows: 
1. Define an energy hypersurface30 over the system’s phase-space,31 delimited (in the 
momenta dimensions) by the energy, U, of the system. Further restrict this restrict this 
space (in the spatial dimensions) by the gross constraint on volume, V.  
2. Partition (coarse-grain) this phase-space into m equal sized volumes32 (or, cells), such that 
each volume v is very small (microscopic), yet contains a statistically large number n of 
molecules. In other words, the total number of particles in the system, N, is much greater 
than the number of particles in a particular cell which in turn is a large number (i.e., N >> n  
>> 1). 
3. Each arrangement is represented by a cell v in phase-space. 
4. Define disjoint regions on this phase-space compatible with macroscopically 
distinguishable distributions, where each region M is a particular distribution of molecules 
across the m partitioned volumes. 
5. For each region M, enumerate the number of arrangements WM compatible with that 
distribution33: 
𝑊𝑀  =  
𝑁! 
(𝑛1! . . . 𝑛m!)
 
 
Alternatively, this can be expressed as a function of phase-space volume, V: 







6. Associate the (natural) logarithm of WM with the thermodynamic entropy SM of the system 
in macrostate M is: 
𝑆𝑀  =  𝑘𝐵 𝑙𝑛 𝑊𝑀 
 
                                                          
30 That is, select only the space compatible with the energy of the system. 
31 A classical molecule has six degrees of freedom (three spatial and three momenta). The state of a molecule is thus fully 
captured as a point on a 6-dimensional state-space—or, µ-space. A gas of N molecules comprises N points on the same 
space or, equivalently, one point on a 6N-dimensional phase-space. In other words, a point on phase-space is identical 
with a particular arrangement of N points on µ-space. See Appendix for more details. 
32 It happens that the natural measure for an N-dimensional state space is the Lebesgue measure. See Appendix for more 
details.  
33 The molecules are assumed to be indistinguishable. We divide the N! multiplicity by a factor (n1! … nM!) to avoid over-
counting. 
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Where kB is a constant, known as Boltzmann’s constant.34 
 
7. Identify the largest region with the Maxwell-Boltzmann equilibrium distribution. This can 
be tested experimentally, for instance, with a dilute gas at equilibrium. 
 
Boltzmann thus derives a microscopic definition of entropy.35 The entropy for a system with given 
macroscopic state (or, macrostate) is proportional to the logarithm of the number of arrangements 
of microstates compatible with that macrostate. This defines an entropy value at all times, even out 
of equilibrium.36 Justification for non-equilibrium entropy assignment and approach to equilibrium 
is discussed below. Importantly37, this definition of entropy is additive (i.e., it is an extensive 
property), as with the thermodynamic definition.38 
 
In short, Boltzmann found that entropy can be expressed as a measure of the number of 
microscopic arrangements associated with a particular macroscopic state. In the case of ice melting, 
for instance, there are vastly more arrangements associated with liquid water at room temperature 
than arrangements associated with a solid structure. 
 
5.4.3 Boltzmann dynamics 
To underwrite the Second Law, Boltzmann considers the behavior of non-equilibrium system 
states. For instance, what would happen to a dilute box of gas39 out of equilibrium? Boltzmann's 
task is to demonstrate that the overwhelmingly likely (probability very close to 1) microscopic 
trajectory of the system is one that monotonically approaches the equilibrium region of phase-
space. 
 
Whereas equilibrium entropy is justified by empirical concord with thermodynamic equilibrium, 
the behavior of non-equilibrium states requires a supplementary postulate. Associating multiplicity 
with probability, one can determine the likelihood of a particular distribution of molecules—or, 
equivalently, the probability of a particular macrostate of the system. Boltzmann achieves this by 
associating the relative volumes of phase-space with probabilities: the larger the volume associated 
                                                          
34 Thermodynamic entropy has units of J/K. The Boltzmann constant, kB ≃ 1.38 × 10−23 J/K, supplies the appropriate units. 
35 Wallace (2011) puts it nicely by saying that Boltzmann entropy is "just a consequence of the geometry of phase space" 
(1). 
36 This extends beyond thermodynamic entropy, which was defined only in equilibrium states. 
37 As we shall see later, when discussing gravity. 
38 See Appendix for calculation. 
39 Boltzmann initially focused on dilute, rarefied gases. 
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with a particular macrostate, the greater the probability of finding the system in that microstate. 
This postulate is founded on the assumption that all microstates (or, arrangements) are equally 
probable. Thus, the probability of a system being in a particular macroscopic state is proportional 
to the volume of the region of microstates compatible with that macrostate. 
 
Consider again the above example of the partitioned box of gas. For any macroscopic system, N is of 
the order of Avagadro’s number (6.02 x1023). Following the combinatorial method, the number of 
possible arrangements associated with a dispersed gas (A + B) vastly outnumber (by 2N times) 
those configurations where the gas is found in only one side (A). Applying the probability postulate, 
the probability of finding all the gas molecules in volume A, therefore, is practically zero—which is 
the desired result.40 
 
Employing this association of phase-space volume with relative probability, Boltzmann (1897) 
argues that a system tends to evolve from macrostates associated with small phase-space volumes 
to those with larger volumes. From an initial low-entropy (and thus unlikely) state, he says, “the 
system will steadily evolve towards more likely states until it has finally reached the most likely 
state, i.e. the state of thermal equilibrium” (395). Boltzmann offers two justifications, described 
below, for his probability postulate. One based on ergodicity and the other based on typicality. 
 
5.4.4 The ergodic argument 
A system is ergodic just in case it satisfies the ergodic hypothesis. The ergodic hypothesis holds 
that, for any non-trivial and non-special microstate, given enough time, a trajectory will pass 
arbitrarily41 close to all accessible states of phase-space. Given that the trajectory of a system 
travels randomly across the accessible system phase-space, then over long periods of time, the time 
spent by a system in any particular region of the phase-space is proportional to the volume of that 
region. This entails that the probability of finding the system in a particular region is proportional 
to the volume of that region. 
 
Consider an energy hypersurface on the phase-space of a finite system of constant energy. The 
claim is that, for the trajectory of any given microstate over the hypersurface, the average time 
spent in a given region of that phase-space (associated with a given macroscopic state) is 
proportional to the size of that volume. Further, an association is made between the relative time 
spent in a region and the probability of finding the system to be in that state. This is motivated by 
                                                          
40 See Appendix for probability calculations. 
41 It is provably false that a trajectory can strictly visit the entire phase-space hypersurface. The Birkhoff-von Neumann 
version of ergodicity avoids this problem by talking about trajectories passing arbitrarily close to every point on the 
accessible phase-space. 
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the principle of indifference: the assumption that all microstates (on the standard measure) are 
equally probable. 
 
The validity of the ergodic hypothesis, however, has been challenged. It is difficult to see how it 
applies for the sort of systems that interest us here (such as an expanding universe). At best, the 
ergodic argument is suggestive that Boltzmann is on the right track. Problems with this argument 
led to a preference for an alternative justification, described below. 
 
5.4.5 The typicality argument 
Consider, again, the energy hypersurface of a thermodynamic system. At first blush, it may appear 
counterintuitive that entropy, defined on the Lebesgue measure,42 can increase. Liouville's 
theorem43 demands that the measure (volume) representing the set of microstates is conserved 
through (classical, deterministic) evolution. This theorem precludes any increase in the phase-
space volume associated with the trajectories of any given set of microstates. However, Liouville's 
theorem only conserves the volume, not the shape, of the initial set of microstates. While the 
number of microstates remains constant, their trajectories may well diverge into different 
(macroscopically distinguishable) regions of phase-space. Given the enormous disparity between 
the volumes of the different regions (associated with macroscopic states), the idea is that the vast 
majority of these microstates very quickly evolve into the region associated with equilibrium 
(which covers the vast majority of the accessible phase-space). 
 
Boltzmann's claim is that for any given non-equilibrium region of phase-space, the overwhelming 
proportion of (but not all) microstates associated with that region, based on the Lebesgue measure, 
have trajectories that approach equilibrium (i.e., entropy-increasing trajectories). A further claim is 
then made, that a typical trajectory is one that would typically be chosen at random.44 Or, in the 
words of Goldstein (2001), a microstate would have to be "ridiculously special" to avoid 
"reasonably quickly" reaching equilibrium and remaining there "for an extremely long time" (43-4). 
 
5.4.6 Approach to equilibrium 
The above argument all but guarantees that a system will spontaneously evolve towards a state of 
equilibrium and then remain in that state indefinitely. For the dilute gas we have been considering, 
the velocity distribution of the molecules quickly approaches the Maxwell-Boltzmann form. The 
argument dispenses with any particular assumptions about collisions or other mechanical details. 
                                                          
42 See Appendix for more details. 
43 See Appendix for brief description of the theorem. 
44 This implies a principle of indifference is employed in assigning probabilities to microstates. 
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Indeed, it need not even represent a gas. But does the approach to equilibrium observed in 
thermodynamic phenomena supervene on this argument? Frigg (2010), for example, argues that 
the assumption of continuous, monotonic approach is non sequitur. 
 
As with all statistical mechanical arguments, it is impossible to offer a proof. Yet, it is possible to 
construct a reasonable, qualitative argument for the appropriate approach to equilibrium. Assume 
(fairly reasonably) that the geometry of phase-space is diffeomorphic: that the space is always 
continuous and differentiable. Assume also that similar microstates (i.e., microstates whose 
macroscopic properties are very similar) are closely located on phase-space. The evolution of a 
given microstate (i.e., its trajectory) thus passes through neighborhood microstates that represent 
gradual changes in macroscopic properties. The assertion is that these trajectories are 
overwhelmingly likely to result in entropy-increasing changes. To see this, consider the 
neighborhood of a low-entropy region. It is surrounded an enormous number of disjoint regions. 
However, some—specifically, those with higher entropy—have vastly larger volumes than others. 
So, it is overwhelmingly more likely that the system will evolve into one of them. 
 
Finally, it seems appropriate to assume that disjoint regions of phase-space (representing 
macroscopically distinguishable states) are distributed (or, "fibrillated"45) more or less randomly 
over the accessible phase-space,46 so that given any initial non-equilibrium condition, its approach 
to equilibrium is not governed by any anisotropies inherent in the phase-space itself.  
 
5.5 POINCARÉ’S RECURRENCE THEOREM 
One interesting challenge to Boltzmann's theory was made by Poincaré and Zermelo. Poincaré 
derived a theorem demonstrating that evolution of a finite, closed system with non-special and non-
trivial phase-space, is guaranteed to return arbitrarily close to its original state after some finite 
time. Applying this theorem to a low-entropy system entails that, while it is overwhelmingly likely 
(as previously shown) the system will evolve to equilibrium (maximal entropy), with certainty it 
will ultimately return to its initial, low-entropy state (or arbitrarily close to that state). And this 
recurrence patently violates the Second Law—in fact, it guarantees violation. 
 
One response to this seemingly fatal problem is that the time required for recurrence, on average, is 
much greater than the average time to reach equilibrium and beyond the time span of any practical 
experiment. Indeed, even for a very small macroscopic system, the average recurrence time would 
                                                          
45 Winsberg (2004) coined this term to denote this distribution on phase-space, described by Albert (2000) as scattered 
in "unimaginably tiny clusters, more or less at random, all over the place" (82). 
46 This is in contrast to the diagrammatic representation of phase-space regions commonly found in these discussions. 
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be much longer that the age of the universe. So, this problem certainly does not present any 
immediate, practical concern (and probably cannot be empirically verified). 
 
Another response challenges the applicability of this theorem to most real systems. In particular, it 
is difficult to see how this theorem applies to the expanding geometry of the universe and its 
attendant phase-space. 
 
5.6 LOSCHMIDT'S REVERSIBILITY PARADOX 
Another objection to Boltzmann’s formulation, originally raised by Joseph Loschmidt, approaches 
the nub of the problem addressed in this paper. In short, Loschmidt recognized that microstates 
come in pairs. In particular, "[e]ach possible trajectory is matched by its time-reversed twin" (Price 
2004 7). Boltzmann's statistical postulate predicts that the vast majority of microstates compatible 
with a system's macrostate are entropy increasing trajectories into the future. But the same 
postulate necessarily predicts the same number of microstates with entropy increasing trajectories 
into the past. 
 
To take a simple example, consider an isolated glass of warm water into which an ice cube has been 
added. Evolving this system into the future, the Boltzmannian statistical postulate predicts that it is 
overwhelmingly likely that the ice will be more melted the further into the future we go. This, of 
course, is what we expect. However, the dynamical laws (in this case, Newtonian) are time-
symmetric47. So, following Loschmidt's insight, for each future trajectory there must be an 
equivalent past trajectory. Retrodicting the same system according to the statistical postulate, it is 
overwhelmingly likely that the ice cube was in a more melted state the further one traces back in 
time. This patently contradicts the Second Law and our experience of the world: Boltzmann's 
theory predicts approach to equilibrium in both temporal directions. This absurd result 
encapsulates Loschmidt's paradox. Boltzmann accepted this to be a real problem with his theory 
and consequently suggested some remarkable remedies, discussed below. 
 
  
                                                          
47 For a discussion about whether quantum mechanics might be an exception, see Appendix. 
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6 THE LOW-ENTROPY PROBLEM 
“[I]f there exists any such thing as ‘equilibrium’ in the context of cosmology, it’s hard to 
understand why we don’t find the universe in that state” 
— Carroll (2004 361) 
 
As the above historical sketch shows, the project of marshalling Newtonian mechanics to 
underwrite thermodynamic phenomena founders on the asymmetry of the Second Law. 
Supplementing the mechanics with a time-independent statistical postulate entails that a given 
isolated macroscopic system is overwhelmingly likely to be either at equilibrium or have a 
trajectory approaching equilibrium. However, statistical mechanics simpliciter (that is, employing 
only dynamical laws and a statistical postulate) fails to make sensible predictions about the past. As 
Loschmidt's reversibility paradox highlights, this probabilistic approach to equilibrium applies 
equally to both temporal directions. 
 
A remedy is required for this absurd retrodiction. One could circumvent the problem by asserting 
that statistical mechanics should be employed only for “forward” predictions. However, this simply 
reduces statistical mechanics to an instrumental theory. Alternatively, one could assume low-
entropy initial conditions for any given experiment. For systems that we have considered thus far, 
such as a gas in a box, the origin of the time-asymmetry is obvious. The system is configured to start 
in a low-entropy state. However, what accounts for the low-entropy condition in the first place? 
And how do we account for systems, such as the universe, that do not benefit from the intervention 
of a contrived initial condition? If statistical mechanics is to count as a fundamental description of 
the world, then it should be applicable to more than experimental scenarios. 
 
6.1 TWO HYPOTHESES 
Cognizant of the problem of retrodiction, Boltzmann proposed two very different explanations for 
the patent existence of low-entropy systems today. In both cases, he hoped to account for the 
observed asymmetry of macroscopic phenomena and to illustrate why it is not entirely surprising 
we find systems (i.e., subsystems in the universe) in initially low-entropy states. The first proposal, 
Boltzmann (1897) describes as follows: 
“The second law will be explained mechanically by means of assumption A (which is of 
course unprovable) that the Universe, considered as a mechanical system--or at least a 
very large part of it which surrounds us—started from a very improbable state, and is 
still in an improbable state” (393). 
 
This is a prototype of the Past Hypothesis, introduced below. 
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For the second proposal (a prototype of Carroll's multiverse, described below), Boltzmann (1895) 
entertains the possibility that, despite appearances, the observable universe forms only a tiny 
region of a vast universe, broadly in equilibrium: 
“We assume that the whole universe is, and rests for ever, in thermal equilibrium. The 
probability that one (only one) part of the universe is in a certain state, is the smaller 
the further this state is from thermal equilibrium; but this probability is greater, the 
greater is the universe itself” (415). 
 
Given a suitably vast universe, this entails that “the probability that such a small part of it as our 
world should be in its present state, is no longer small” (415). Of course, as Price (2004) notes, “it’s 
one thing to explain why the universe contains regions like ours, but another to explain why we find 
ourselves in one. If they are rare, isn't it more likely that we would find ourselves somewhere else?” 
(225). Boltzmann attempts to address this concern by appealing to the anthropic principle. He 
asserts (roughly) that the tiny probability of finding ourselves in this part of the universe is 
mitigated by the fact that we could not find ourselves in any inhospitable location. Applying this 
principle dramatically reduces the number of regions in which we could find ourselves. We find 
ourselves in such a special location in this vast universe because it supports the existence of 
intelligent life necessary to question the likelihood in the first place. 
 
6.2 BOLTZMANN BRAINS 
However, there is a flaw in Boltzmann's argument. Feynman (1994), for instance, finds Boltzmann's 
idea "ridiculous," since "the prediction would be that if we looked at a place where we had not 
looked before, it would be disordered" (115). Any new observation demonstrates this to be false. 
More worrying, empirical adequacy only demands that the patch of the universe we live in extend 
enough to support life: any additional complexity would demand lower entropy and thus 
dramatically decrease the probability of its occurrence. The statistical fluctuation that produces 
something like the state of the observable universe from the Big Bang 14 billion years ago is vastly 
less likely than a fluctuation a moment ago producing a brain with the relevant conscious state. 
Disturbingly, this entails, as Carroll (2011) notes, it is "overwhelmingly more likely that your 
memory is just a random fluctuation" (41). This is known as the Boltzmann Brains paradox,48  an 
argument ad absurdum that illustrates the inadequacy of the hypothesis. 
 
                                                          
48 The term 'Boltzmann brains' was coined in Albrecht & Sorbo (2004). 
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7 MODERN COSMOLOGY 
Boltzmann lived at a time when relatively little was known about the universe, and when 
foundational mechanical laws were Newtonian, which presumed an absolute, Euclidean space-time. 
Unable to avail himself of modern cosmology, Boltzmann's suggestions, while audacious and 
prescient, were necessarily constrained by the limits of contemporary science. Advances in 
cosmology have reinvigorated the field of statistical mechanics and offer new insights into the 
nature of entropy. Boltzmann's conjecture of an initial low-entropy condition for the universe (his 
Assumption A) has been adopted and developed by modern thinkers, equipped with new physical 
theories and a more detailed empirical description of the cosmos. Modern cosmology affords a 
special, low-entropy condition, namely the Big Bang. A brief interlude is apposite to review some 
pertinent modern cosmology. 
 
7.1 THE BIG BANG 
The twentieth century saw dramatic advances in our understanding of the cosmos and a 
concomitant revision of our fundamental physical laws. Since the advent of general relativity, it is 
impossible to make the same assumptions that Boltzmann et al. made about the universe. A static 
space-time, for instance, is not a solution to Einstein’s field equations: general relativity demands a 
universe that is either expanding or contracting.49 
 
In 1929, Edwin Hubble noticed that galaxies exhibit red Doppler shifts correlated with their 
distance, providing strong evidence of an expanding universe and supporting the Big Bang model. 
And in 1964, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson furnished stronger evidence. They observed 
extremely uniform blackbody microwave radiation in all directions of the sky, now known as the 
cosmic microwave background (CMB). Subsequent application of general relativity theory 
(particularly, solutions to Einstein's field equations), supported by a vast body of empirical 
evidence from astrophysics and particle physics, has produced an astonishingly detailed account of 
the history of the universe that dates back to less than a second before its inception. Models and 
data estimate the age of the universe at around 14 billion years. The history of the universe is 
confidently modeled back (through its expansion phases in reverse) to about 10-32 s after the Big 
Bang, and somewhat more controversially, back to the start of the inflationary period at about 10-36 
s. Models of primordial nucleosynthesis accurately predict the universe's particular mixture of 
elements (mainly hydrogen and helium). And the CMB offers evidence of the aftermath of the Big 
Bang, providing a detailed map of the universe during the epoch of photon decoupling (around 
400,000 years after the Big Bang, after which the universe was no longer an opaque plasma). 
                                                          
49 Interestingly, Einstein struggled with this consequence of GR and famously added what is now known as the 
cosmological constant to obviate this. 
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However, the very special conditions for the Big Bang present a fine-tuning problem for 
cosmologists. Observations of our universe seem to demand an early universe fantastically flat, 
suspiciously smooth, and conspicuously lacking magnetic monopoles. Firstly, measurement of the 
curvature of the universe today shows it to be very flat.50 According to general relativity, this entails 
that the early universe must have been extremely flat—and this seems unlikely without further 
explanation. This is called the flatness problem. 
 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, the early universe was remarkably homogeneous and isotropic. 
We have strong evidence of this uniformity from the CMB, which is homogeneous to 1 part in 105. 
Such agreement (it is believed) could only be achieved if these regions were once in causal contact 
in order to reach this apparent thermal equilibrium. But the Big Bang model fails to bring those 
regions within light-like separation (light would not have had time to travel between these regions) 
at early times.51 In other words, these regions appear to have been causally disconnected around 
the time of the Big Bang. And so, such thermodynamic agreement seems anomalous. That causally 
isolated regions of the CMB exhibit such remarkable homogeneity demands explanation. This is 
called the horizon problem. 
 
Finally, Grand Unified Theories (GUTs) predict the plentiful production of stable magnetic 




In 1980, Alan Guth proposed a solution to the abovementioned puzzles. Positing the existence of an 
inflaton field—a sort of high-density dark energy—Guth surmised that shortly after the Big Bang, a 
patch of this field was in a high-potential energy state (or false vacuum). This unstable state lasted 
only briefly (from around 10-36 s until 10-32 s after the Big Bang) before decaying to its ground (or, 
true vacuum) state via a phase transition. The energy released during this transition generated 
matter and radiation. However, it also acted like a powerful repulsive form of gravity, driving a 
period of exponential expansion, known as inflation. Guth (1981) asserts that this exponential 
growth effectively flattens nearly all52 inhomogeneities (solving the flatness problem). And 
infinitesimally close (therefore, causally connected) regions in the early universe are driven apart 
                                                          
50 Astrophysicists can measure critical density and employ the Friedmann equations to determine curvature. Current 
measurements suggest curvature is close to or actually zero, within error margins. 
51 The largest regions on the surface of last scatter (the CMB) causally connected today are separated by about 200Mpc. 
But the horizon comprises more than 20,000 such regions all sharing the same temperature (2.73 K) to 1 part in 105. 
52 Bar, importantly, the effects of quantum fluctuations. 
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fast enough53 to explain how space-like54 regions in the observable universe could once have been 
causally connected (solving the horizon problem). Finally, by locating this inflationary epoch after 
(the GUT prediction of) monopole production, the expansion dilutes the prevalence of monopoles 
to such an extent that the chance of one existing in our comoving patch is practically nil. 
 
In fact, the unalloyed model sketched above was shown to not to work. Specifically, the false 
vacuum decay here, occurring only through quantum tunneling (or, “bubble nucleation”), fails to 
generate any (empirically required) radiation. However, this failure is addressed55 in an improved 
version, called “slow-roll” inflation. This popular paradigm posits an extended low-gradient (thus 
“slow-roll”) potential for the inflaton field, which allows sufficient time for the requisite expansion 
before the sudden transition to true vacuum that reheats the universe—generating matter and 
radiation. 
 
However, the particular properties of this inflaton field introduce a peculiar consequence. The 
abovementioned decay of the false vacuum is non-uniform56: some patches decay before others. 
This inevitably generates patches (or “bubbles”) of true vacuum amidst a sea of false vacuum. While 
the true vacuum bubbles are no longer influenced by the inflaton field (and inflation has effectively 
ended), outside bubble exponential expansion continues. Guth (2007) argues that “in any successful 
inflationary model the rate of exponential expansion is always much faster than the rate of 
exponential decay. Therefore, even though the false vacuum is decaying, it never disappears, and in 
fact the total volume of the false vacuum, once inflation starts, continues to grow exponentially with 
time, ad infinitum” (6). In short, the false vacuum expands faster than it decays. Consequently, 
inflation never ends. This outcome, coined “eternal inflation,” is interpreted as a serious failure by 
some. Others, such as Carroll (as we shall see later), employ this outcome to solve other puzzles. 
 
Understandably, the simplicity and power of Guth’s inflationary model is beguiling. And in 2014, 
BICEP257 reported further potential evidence arguably58 favoring inflation, with the detection of 
primordial gravitational waves59 in the B-mode spectrum of the CMB (purported relics of the 
                                                          
53 In this case, about 60 e-foldings in less than 10-35 s. 
54 Space-like events are events separated by a distance greater than the time it would take light to travel between them—
thus, causally disconnected. 
55 Similar “slow-roll” solutions were proposed independently by Linde (1982) and Albrecht & Steinhardt (1982). 
56 Guth (2007) suggests that it is analogous to the exponential decay of radioactive substances. 
57 See Ade, Aikin, Barkats, et al. (2014). 
58 There are those who contend validity of inflation. See Ijjas, Steinhardt & Loeb (2013). 
59 Inflation should generate theoretically detectable gravitational waves. Detection of such gravitational waves is 
generally considered to confer strong evidence for the inflation model. Specifically, detection of primordial tensor B-
modes in the CMB would confirm the existence of tensor perturbations in the early universe. 
Miles Dawborne   Explaining Low Entropy  
MA Thesis 2014  33 of 75 
exponential growth epoch). More recent analysis of the BICEP2 results questions this conclusion.60 
Nonetheless, a large majority of cosmologists believe the inflation paradigm is correct.  
 
7.3 LOW-ENTROPY EARLY UNIVERSE 
Cosmologists have availed themselves of this detailed history of the universe to tackle the problem 
of explaining the prevalence of low-entropy subsystems. Prima facie, the Big Bang offers a cosmic 
boundary on which to anchor the requisite low-entropy condition. Strong evidence suggests that 
the early universe was in a hot, dense and highly uniform state. The basic claim is that this was a 
very low entropy state relative to today, thus accounting the observation that our universe is far 
from thermal equilibrium. But attempts to justify this claim have met with myriad difficulties. 
Assuming a random choice amongst possible states for the early universe, a Big-Bang state is 
extremely unlikely. And introducing an inflationary epoch only exacerbates the problem. The 
standard inflation model (at least, according to the chaotic inflation model popular with many 
cosmologists) assumes that the initial conditions of our universe are realized “naturally.” However, 
as we can see, the entropy of the universe just before inflation would have been extremely low, 
making such an eventuality proportionately unlikely. At first, this might not seem a problem, as the 
eternal inflation paradigm allows for any number of attempts. The problem, however, is that it is 
much more likely that the universe we know came about without inflation. To understand this, 
remember that the entropy of the universe after inflation is roughly 1088, whereas before inflation, 
it is estimated61 to be 1012. So, the chance that the universe resulted from an inflationary period is 
almost zero. Carroll and Chen (2005) explain the situation as follows: "the proto-inflationary patch 
and our current universe are two configurations of the same system, since one can evolve into the 
other. There are many more ways for that system to look like our current universe than to be in a 
proto-inflationary configuration" (3). They conclude that "it would much more likely to simply find 
a patch that looks like our universe today, than to find one that was about to begin inflating" (3). 
 
So, inflation alone cannot explain the low-entropy conditions of the early universe. It does, though, 
offer the possibility of making some interesting conjectures about the universe that potentially offer 
a direct solution to the problem. This is taken up by Sean Carroll, as we shall see below. 
  
                                                          
60 See, for instance, Adam, R., Ade, P. A. R., et al. (2014). Also, see this World Science Festival article:  
http://www.worldsciencefestival.com/2014/09/gravitational-waves-new-data-points-galactic-dust-bicep2s-lens/. 
61 Carroll (2010) estimates entropy before inflation to be 1012, assuming energy is 1% of the Planck scale. 
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8 THE PAST HYPOTHESIS 
“[I]t is necessary to add to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the universe 
was more ordered” 
– Feynman (1994) 
 
Consider any macroscopic thermodynamic system in a low-entropy state. Given that statistical 
mechanics deems low-entropy states unlikely, what accounts for this eventuality? One might 
respond by suggesting the system was in an even lower entropy state previously. However, this 
(even less likely) earlier state likewise requires a similar explanation, resulting in an infinite 
regress. Unless a dynamical explanation is available, one seems bound to respond by imposing an 
ultimate constraint on the past state of the system. The Past Hypothesis is such a response. 
 
An elaboration of Boltzmann's Assumption A, mentioned above, the Past Hypothesis associates the 
early universe (at, or shortly after, the Big Bang) with low entropy. Albert (2000) describes the idea 
as follows: "that the world first came into being in whatever particular low-entropy highly 
condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential procedures of 
cosmology will eventually present to us" (96). Supplementing statistical mechanics with this 
assumption purportedly suffices to account for the non-equilibrium state of the universe today and 
the attendant asymmetric processes that accord with the Second Law. Conditioning on a low-
entropy past effectively excludes all but a very small set of microstates that have entropy increasing 
trajectories in the past. As Callender (2004) puts it, "conditionalizing on [the Past Hypothesis] 
makes all sorts of improbable events probable" (241).62 In so doing, the claim is that a sensible 
history can be recovered. 
 
To see how this works, consider the following example. At time, t0, a sealed box at room 
temperature contains a cup of hot coffee. Employ statistical mechanics to evolve the state of the 
system (coffee in box). Statistical mechanics predicts that it is overwhelmingly likely (i.e., with a 
probability approaching 1) that the system will approach maximal entropy (equilibrium). 
Presumably, in this case, this entails the coffee cooling and evaporating until its temperature is 
equilibrated with the air in the box.63 Consider the initial state of the system (hot coffee in box of 
cool air) at time, t0. The entropy of the system, Ssystem = Scoffee + Sair. After five minutes, at time t1, the 
                                                          
62 Albert (2000) advertises further benefits of this hypothesis: an explanation for our epistemic access to the past and not 
to the future; our ability to affect the future and not the past; etc. However, the focus here is simply the efficacy of the Past 
Hypothesis to explain the Second Law. 
63 It remains in this approximate state, in local thermal equilibrium, for an extended period. Gradually and over a longer 
period, it approaches another local thermal equilibrium at time, t3, whereby all the coffee has now evaporated and is 
evenly dispersed in the box. This process continues through intermediary local thermal equilibrium stages lasting much 
longer, until finally the system reaches maximal equilibrium. 
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coffee is cooler (Scoffee is lower) and the box is warmer (Sair is higher): ΔSair - ΔScoffee > 0. So, Ssystem is 
higher. After ten minutes, at time t2, the coffee approaches proximate temperature to the air. In 
other words, the coffee has equilibrated with the air. This is the maximal entropy for the system: 
Ssystem = Smaximum. 
 
The problem statistical mechanics faces without the Past Hypothesis is that retrodiction is 
empirically disconfirmed. Evolving the system backwards (into the past) charts the same 
proportion of microstates compatible with the macrostate, and with the same trajectories. In other 
words, it is overwhelmingly likely the system would approach maximal entropy in the past. For 
example, evolve the system backwards five minutes from time, t1, and statistical mechanics predicts 
that at time, t0, the system is overwhelmingly likely to be in a state of higher entropy—in fact, in the 
same state as at time, t2. That is, statistical mechanics predicts that at t0, Ssystem = Smaximum. The 
evolution of the system is symmetric about any chosen instance of time.  
 
Evolve the system backwards from time, t1, while conditionalizing on the Past Hypothesis, however, 
and the probability that the system is in a state of higher entropy, such as that at time, t2, is tiny. 
Indeed, it is overwhelmingly likely that the system five minutes before time, t1, is at a lower 
entropy. That is, at t0, we recover the initial conditions of hot coffee in cool box. Or, to describe this 
in phase-space, given an initial state, define a measure over the energy hypersurface of the system. 
Assign a probability measure over the disjoint regions of the hypersurface. Taking small time-steps 
forward, the overwhelming majority of the microstates compatible with the macrostate of the 
system evolve monotonically towards the region of largest standard measure volume (associated 
with maximal entropy). Conversely, the proportion of compatible microstates that have trajectories 
leading into regions of equal or lower entropy is extremely unlikely. 
 
Introducing the Past Hypothesis imposes a constraint on possible past states. The relative 
proportion of microstates compatible with a low-entropy early universe is tiny. The associated 
probability distribution employed to make inferences about the future is thus conditioned on a very 
small volume of accessible phase-space. And the vast majority of those microstates are entropy-
increasing trajectories. Conversely, retrodiction allows for only a very restricted probability 
distribution compatible with the Past Hypothesis, in accord with our everyday expectations. 
 
Albert (2000) offers a colorful, qualitative account of how these expectations are met. Imagine 
digging-up an old boot, which appears to have once been worn by Napoleon. Bereft of the Past 
Hypothesis to hand, the simple statistical-mechanical probability of finding his other boot in the 
vicinity would be “overwhelmingly small.” Indeed, it is far more likely that the boot is a fluctuation 
from equilibrium (a la Boltzmann Brains). If, however, “the distribution we use is the one that’s 
uniform over those regions of the phase space of the universe which are compatible both with what 
we have thus far been able to observe of its present physical situation and with its having initially 
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started out with a big bang, then that first boot will plausibly count as evidence for the truth of the 
proposition that there was once such a person as Napoleon, and the probability of our finding 
another such boot, if we dig around a bit further, will plausible be much more substantial” (94).  
 
8.1 EVIDENCE 
Current understanding of physics demands that the entropy of the early universe was very low 
relative to today.64 If this were found not to be the case then, assuming the universe is a closed 
system, the Second Law would be violated.65 The Past Hypothesis is thus falsifiable, and it seems 
appropriate to look for evidence of this low-entropy state. However, Wallace (2009) raises a point 
about the subtlety of entropic processes: “Since entropy is a measure of phase-space volume, ceteris 
paribus cooling lowers entropy and expanding raises it, and it isn't immediately obvious which 
should dominate” (2). This point serves to warn against reliance upon purely qualitative 
assessments of entropy. And so it will be instructive to review the current science of the early 
universe and report on recent attempts at estimating entropy in the universe. Notwithstanding 
some concerns voiced over the validity of such calculations (see Earman et al. below), what do we 
know about the total entropy in the universe—now, in the past and in the future? 
 
Even with today's theories and evidence at our disposal, accurately quantifying the entropy of the 
universe is not a simple task. However, there are some shortcuts.66 Given our knowledge of the 
early universe, we can say that before structure formation (around 400,000 years after the Big 
Bang), gravity (at least, in the classical sense) would not have had any significant influence. 
Neglecting gravity here allows us to calculate entropy using standard thermodynamics. Assume 
also that the early universe was in thermal equilibrium. This is not strictly true, but if expansion is a 
small contributory factor then the universe may be considered to be in local thermal equilibrium. 
Given these assumptions, early universe entropy is estimated to be 1088 (Carroll 2011 63). 
 
Today, gravity cannot be ignored. "In the very early universe," explains Carroll (2011), "the 
temperature is high and the pressure is enormous. The local gravity between particles is too weak 
to bring them together, and the initial smoothness of the matter and radiation is preserved. But as 
the universe expands and cools, the pressure drops, and gravity begins to take over" (296-7). The 
                                                          
64 We are speaking here about the observable universe. This does not preclude (a potentially vast) unobservable universe 
at higher entropy. This is discussed later. 
65 One could argue that the universe is not an isolated system, but this would require strong justification and none seems 
available. 
66 Carroll (2011) says: "Because we don't have quantum gravity all figured out, it's hard to make definitive statements 
about the entropy of the universe. But we do have some basic tools at our disposal--the idea that entropy has been 
increasing since the Big Bang, the principle of information conservation, the predictions of classical general relativity, the 
Berkenstein-Hawking formula for black-hole entropy--that we can use to draw some reliable conclusions" (295). 
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structure we observe in the universe, stars, galaxies, etc., are a direct result of gravitational forces. 
So, standard thermodynamics is not useful. However, recent theories (employing general relativity 
and quantum mechanics) posit the existence of black holes.  
 
Black holes provide some important clues as to the nature of entropy. Importantly, we can calculate 
the amount of entropy they harbor.67 Work done by Hawking, Penrose, et al., suggest that 
interstellar black holes harbor enormous amounts of entropy. In fact, the total entropy of all these 
black holes dwarfs the entropy of other baryonic formations, even galaxies. This allows a 
convenient approximation to be made about the entropy content of the universe.68 Estimates for 
the entropy of the universe today are about 10101. 
 
According to modern cosmological observations, the universe appears to be entering a new phase 
of accelerated expansion (albeit less dramatic than during the period of inflation). Consequently, 
the universe appears doomed to continue expanding at an ever fast rate, forever. We can estimate 
maximal69 entropy, when the universe reaches equilibrium ('heat death') state. The trick here is to 
add all the matter in the known universe, consolidate it in a single black hole, and calculate its 
entropy. (Technically, this is not maximal entropy, due to Hawking radiation that entails black hole 
evaporation. But it provides a rough, lower-bound value.) Its entropy value is roughly 10120. 
 
If correct, these calculations tell us that the universe seems to be (broadly and to rough 
approximation) observing the Second Law. They fall short, however, of offering an explanation for 
why the universe was at such a low entropy in the past. 
 
  
                                                          
67 Essentially, this works by assuming a very close analogy between black hole dynamics and thermodynamics. 
68 See Appendix for a rough calculation. 
69 If there is a maximum—more on this later. 
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9 OBJECTIONS TO THE PAST HYPOTHESIS 
“Simplicity is nice, but truth is better” 
—Callender (2011 35) 
 
No doubt, postulating the Past Hypothesis is convenient. It provides a powerful and elegant 
response to the problem of low entropy based on scientific evidence. But this simple solution is not 
without its critics. There are two broad concerns. The first concern, which is the subject of this 
section, is technical: does the empirical evidence support the Past Hypothesis? That is, is it possible 
to define and calculate the entropy of the universe? And does a statistical mechanical description of 
the Second Law apply to the conditions of the universe? 
 
The second concern, addressed later, is philosophical: does the Past Hypothesis offer an adequate 
scientific explanation? 
 
9.1 EARLY UNIVERSE EQUILIBRIUM 
One immediate problem with the standard argument for the Past Hypothesis is that according to 
the standard cosmological model, the early universe appears to have been in thermal equilibrium. 
Recent measurements of the CMB frequency spectrum reveal very precise agreement with that of 
blackbody radiation: the spectrum of thermal equilibrium. Thus, at the time photon decoupling, the 
universe must have been in or very close to a state of thermal equilibrium (or, at least, local thermal 
equilibrium). In fact, this is demanded by the Standard Model (for instance, to account for the very 
uniform temperature of the CMB). That is, under the normal way of thinking about maximal 
entropy, this is achieved when a system is uniformly distributed and at uniform temperature. This 
presents a puzzle, as the cosmological argument for the Past Hypothesis is that at or around the 
time of the Big Bang, the entropy of the universe was very low and definitely not in thermal 
equilibrium. So, how does this accord with a low-entropy universe? 
 
The general response to this puzzle is to claim that once general relativity is taken into 
consideration, the association between a homogeneous and isotropic thermodynamic system and 
maximal entropy no longer applies. Penrose (2010), for instance, argues that it is the suppression of 
the gravitational degrees of freedom that account for the low-entropy state of the early universe. 
The effect of gravity results in different macroscopic phenomena: higher entropy states will be 
'clumpy' rather than smooth. To be sure, the relation between volumes of phase-space and entropy 
stand. However, decreasing volumes in the spatial dimensions of phase-space are compensated (it 
is argued) by greater increases in the momentum dimensions. In other words, the uniform 
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condition of the early universe was actually a very low entropy state from which it has evolved into 
non-uniform structures, such as stars and galaxies. Thus, the Second Law is not violated. 
 
9.2 THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE 
There is another response, which is to state that, due to the expansion of the universe, necessarily 
the initial state cannot have been at global equilibrium. Wallace (2009), for instance, argues that 
gravity played no part in moving from local thermal equilibrium. A few minutes after the Big Bang, 
when temperatures were above 1011 K, hydrogen plasma was at local thermal equilibrium. This 
equilibrium, he suggests, was broken due to expansion, which lowered the temperature to below 
1011 K and so, effectively, "the energy barriers to fusion became high enough relative to typical 
particle energies that the fusion reactions required to maintain equilibrium were unable to occur 
fast enough" (16). In other words, the early universe was at local thermodynamic equilibrium but 
not global thermodynamic equilibrium.70 
 
This raises another concern about calculating the entropy of the universe. Is the phase-space 
associated with the universe conserved during expansion or does it grow? An immediate problem 
with a growing state space is that it is at odds with the information-preserving theories (quantum 
mechanics and general relativity) on which modern cosmology is founded.71 The obvious answer 
seems to be that all the potentially accessible phase-space should be considered. Carroll (2011), for 
instance, advocates entropy calculation by comparing it to the largest possible entropy of the 
system rather than to the maximal entropy compatible with its current constraints. He offers an 
analogy (294) for calculating the entropy in a box of gas where the gas is packed into one corner, 
arguing that we would consider this a low entropy condition by comparing it the phase space of the 
whole box. 
 
The problem with including the entire accessible phase-space, rather than that accessible by 
contemporary (space-time volume) constraints, is that it may be infinite. This, at least practically, 
makes any calculations based on the phase-space intractable. A trick that physicists have employed 
to avoid this problem is to talk in terms of entropy density over a limited space (e.g., our comoving 
patch). 
 
                                                          
70 Wallace offers the analogy of a box of gas comprising hydrogen and oxygen at room temperature and atmospheric 
pressure, which appear to be at equilibrium. "In fact, though, it is highly entropically favorable for the gases to react to 
form water. But the energy barrier to doing so is high, so that the gases will only obtain this higher-entropy state on 
extremely long timescales" (15). 
71 Confusingly, Callender (2004) understands expansion to be "an 'adiabatic' process, one that is 'isentropic'--that is, its 
entropy doesn't change--and reversible" (252). It is unclear how he aligns this with the Second Law. 
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9.3 RELAXATION TIME 
Even given a low-entropy early universe, why is the universe in such a low-entropy state today 
(relative to current estimates of its maximal entropy, if finite)? The popular response to this 
question is (roughly) because entropy was even lower in the past (as we have just calculated) and 
insufficient time has passed for the universe to reach equilibrium. This argument is then extended 
back to around the time of the Big Bang, which in consequence must therefore have been in a state 
of extremely low entropy relative to today. “The universe,” explains Price (1996), “seems to have 
been in a very special condition at this time—so special, in fact, that some ten to twenty billion 
years later, the effects are still working their way through the system” (78). The answer, then, is 
that the early universe was in such a low-entropy state relative to today that even after 14 billion 
years, it remains far from equilibrium. According to the rough entropy calculations made above, 
this sounds plausible. However, a more detailed and quantitative response is expected. 
 
9.4 INTRODUCING GRAVITY 
“With gravity, inhomogeneity is the new homogeneity” 
—Callender (2010 41) 
 
For the small-scale examples thus far discussed (e.g., a box of gas), the effects of gravity can safely 
be ignored. On cosmological scales, gravity is the dominating force and presumably plays a 
significant role in determining (at least, local) thermodynamic equilibrium states and the approach 
to equilibrium. To this end, much recent literature on cosmological entropy focuses on the role of 
gravity in entropy calculation. This section delineates some of the distinct concerns and differing 
opinions that gravity has generated in the literature. 
 
9.4.1 General Relativity 
Significant concerns have been raised about the apparent failure of statistical mechanics in the 
context of general relativity. Boltzmannian entropy is defined as a volume measure over phase-
space. Yet, it is far from obvious that such a definition is possible when applied to the universe. The 
Standard Model of the universe defines the Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) metric for 
solutions to the Einstein equations of general relativity. Without a unique measure on this space, 
calculating entropy is impossible. But Earman (2006) argues that the standard measure does not 
normalize and is thus "ill-defined." Further, without a measure that is "time-translationally 
invariant" (417), Boltzmann cannot underwrite the Second Law. These problems lead Wald (2006) 
to advise caution "when applying thermodynamic arguments to general relativistic systems, such as 
the entire universe," since to date there is "no meaningful notion of 'the total energy of the 
universe'" (396). However, he expresses hope that a quantum theory of gravity may come to the 
rescue, and points to black hole thermodynamics as evidence for this hope. Callender (2010) is 
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similarly hopeful, arguing that the development of such measures "is still in its infancy" (36) and 
holds out hope of a solution.  
 
That said, Wallace (2009) suggests that for most processes (with the possible exception of black 
holes), gravitational degrees of freedom can be ignored and we can revert to normal, Newtonian 
space-time and standard Boltzmannian calculations for entropy. He attacks prevalent conceptions 
of gravitational entropy, suggesting that much of this discussion is confused and that gravitational 
entropy is "irrelevant." Some of his arguments are worthy of note. For instance, while a theory of 
quantum gravity has yet to be developed and we do not know how gravity behaved at extremely 
early periods (10-43 s) of the universe, we do know that the degrees of freedom of gravity freeze-out 
at very high temperature. So, by the time the universe has cooled to the still very hot temperature of 
the early universe at, say, the time shortly after inflation (~10-34 s), gravitational degrees of freedom 
are not included in entropy calculations, similar to the freeze-out of neutrinos around the time of 
recombination (~3000 K). So, calculations of early universe entropy around this time can be 
performed in the standard way. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that gravity ceases to play an important factor in the evolution of the 
universe and its approach to equilibrium. Indeed, on such large scales, the impact of gravity 
seriously complicates matters, possibly causing non-deterministic local thermal-equilibrium states. 
But it does not add new complexity to entropy calculation at a specific time. The accessible phase-
space of the early universe is delimited by the degrees of freedom not frozen-out. 
 
9.4.2 Extensivity 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned concerns about defining general relativistic entropy, 
Newtonian gravitational thermodynamics raises its own problems. Firstly, both thermodynamics 
and statistical mechanics rely on the assumption that energy and entropy are extensive state 
functions.72 This assumption breaks down for systems with significant long-range forces, such as 
self-gravitating systems. In which case, statistical mechanical assumptions must be revisited.73 With 
gravity, the total energy is not simply the sum of parts of a system. Gravitational potential energy 
contributes to the overall energy of the system. As Callender (2010 49) points out, this means that 
the sum of the momentum entropy and the position entropy cannot be simply added. 
 
Secondly, there is a concern about how the standard Boltzmannian arguments that associate 
volumes in phase-space with thermodynamic entropy (and thus giving those volume physical 
                                                          
72 For example, consider two subsystems, A and B, with associated entropies SA and SB. Discounting the effects of gravity, 
the entropy of the combined system is simply SA + SB. 
73 See, for instance, Sheehan & Gross (2006) for a discussion of the problem of assuming extensivity. 
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significance) applies in the context of gravity. As Winsberg (2012) describes, a Boltzmannian 
account comprises a phase-space of all possible configurations of a thermodynamic system (such as 
the universe). Combined with a dynamics (classical or quantum), one can chart the evolution of the 
system. A key assumption, though, is that this phase-space can be carved-up into macrostates—that 
is, disjoint regions of phase-space—that represent certain observable features of the system (e.g., 
pressure, temperature) at a coarse-grained level. It is also assumed that an equilibrium state covers 
the vast majority of this phase-space. Yet, as described above, this is somewhat problematic at 
larger scales when gravity dominates. But how does one determine the maximum volume (if there 
is one) in self-gravitating systems? Gravity seems to put a spanner in the works. Defining an energy 
constraint becomes problematic and undermines the argument for the typical approach to 
equilibrium. This, of course, is essential for Boltzmannian statistical mechanics to demonstrate the 
operation of the Second Law. 
 
9.4.3 Dynamics 
Beyond these qualitative concerns regarding the non-extensivity of self-gravitating systems, 
another problem looms. As Wallace (2009) highlights, the effects of gravity also introduce subtle 
complexities into entropy calculation. Specifically, without a quantitative assessment, it is not 
obvious whether gravitational entropy in an expanding universe increases or decreases total 
entropy. Such expansion, he says, “increases the gas's volume (which increases the entropy), but it 
also increases the potential energy and thus decreases the kinetic energy, as particles must do work 
against the attractive gravitational field. So we should expect expanding gases to cool down, and 
this decreases entropy. (Or conversely, and in more microphysical terms, if a gravitating gas 
contracts then the spatial volume available to particles decreases but the momentum-space volume 
increases.) In principle, it could be the case that the cooling effect is entropically more important 
than the expansion, so that contraction is entropy increasing” (8). Making some rough calculations, 
Wallace concludes that, under non-relativistic conditions (relevant to most scenarios, bar 
phenomena such as black holes), there are “some grounds for scepticism as to whether 
gravitational collapse is really an entropy-increasing process” (10). If his calculations are correct 
(and assumptions well-founded), then the entropy of baryonic matter in the universe is lower now 
than at the time of the early universe. 
 
Before we begin to worry that this violates the Second Law, Wallace assures us that such low 
baryonic entropy today is more than compensated for by high-energy radiation generated. As gas 
clouds collapsed and formed into stars, it was entropically favorable for them to emit 
electromagnetic radiation. Importantly, “the entropy decrease in the entropy of matter is more than 
compensated for by the entropy increase in the entropy of the electromagnetic field” (14). Thus, the 
overall budget of entropy in the universe increased. 
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9.5 SUBSYSTEMS 
The Past Hypothesis is necessarily cosmological in scale. It purports to explain the thermodynamic 
behavior of isolated systems by reference to a very special cosmological initial condition some 14 
billion years ago. This relies on the assertion that there exists an unproblematic translation from 
the entropic asymmetry observed at the scale of the universe to similar asymmetric processes at 
the local level. In other words, the behavior of a cup of coffee cooling or of smoke dispersing can be 
explained by reference to the low-entropy state of the early universe. 
 
Is this assertion warranted? Does local asymmetry supervene on global (i.e. cosmological) 
asymmetry? If so, how is this claim substantiated? What constraints are imposed upon the 
subsystem by the Past Hypothesis, such that the proportion of those microstates overwhelmingly 
comprise entropy-increasing trajectories? To be sure, it is demonstrably unlikely that a subsystem 
will spontaneously exhibit entropy decreasing behavior. But what accounts for this? Is this 
correlation with the global system due to the initial state of the universe or is it due to more local 
considerations, such as the surrounding environment of the system? For example, an isolated box of 
gas initially in a low-entropy state, spontaneously approaches its equilibrium state, in accord with 
the Second Law. How is this invariable evolution dependent on the low-entropy initial condition of 
the universe? 
 
It is worth noting that all isolated subsystems were once connected to the universe and indeed, in a 
strict sense, always are. Further, the probability distribution over the initial condition of the 
subsystem is not uniform but, having been part of the universe, is conditioned on the Past 
Hypothesis. Given the Past Hypothesis, this is overwhelmingly likely to be one associated with a 
low-entropy past. Thus, as Price (1996) explains, all (or nearly all) subsystems we encounter 
"ultimately owe their condition to the state of the universe very early in its history. They have all 
escaped from the same bottle, in effect, and this explains why they all approach that bottle as we 
follow them toward the past" (45). 
 
At least qualitatively, this argument may account for the retrodiction of subsystems toward a low-
entropy past. But how does this rationale constrain predictions about the future of the subsystem? 
Is a further assumption required, along with the Past Hypothesis, to account for everyday 
experiences of entropy increasing phenomena? The concern here is that postulating a low-entropy 
past does not explain the adherence of subsystems (more or less isolated processes) to the Second 
Law. Earman (2006), for instance, claims that, as "Boltzmann entropy is a global quantity that 
characterizes the macrostate of the system," it places little relevant constraint on any subsystem 
(419). Similarly, Winsberg (2004) argues that while the Past Hypothesis may explain entropic 
increase of the universe as a whole, "it cannot explain the increasing entropy of relatively small, 
relatively short-lived systems in energetic isolation without succumbing to the same problems that 
beset Boltzmann" (490). Consider a (practically isolated) glass of lukewarm water into which an ice 
cube has been added. It is certainly the case that this subsystem was chosen from the universe and 
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so any of the ensemble of microstates of the subsystem compatible with the initial condition of an 
ice cube in a glass of warm water has been chosen from a (much larger) set of microstates that are 
compatible with the Past Hypothesis. But the initial state of the subsystem is such that, any 
microstate of the subsystem is necessarily compatible with the Past Hypothesis. What further 
constraints are placed on the proportion of microstates of the subsystem, such that it would be 
reasonable to assume that the overwhelming proportion of those microstates have entropy 
increasing trajectories? Winsberg (2004) contends that the entropic increase of a system does not 
supervene on the entropic increase of the universe as a whole: "Just because there is a uniform 
distribution of over some space, it does not follow mathematically that there is a uniform 
distribution of every (lower-dimensional) subspace of that space" (501-2). It is by no means 
obvious, he argues, that the Past Hypothesis applies any significant constraint on isolated 
subsystems. 
 
In contrast, Albert asserts that an isolated subsystem is overwhelmingly likely to parallel the 
entropic increase of the universe: that the microstates compatible with the (low entropy) 
macrostate of the subsystem are also on entropy-increasing trajectories. That is, the vast majority 
of those microstates have trajectories whereby the entropy of the subsystem in the near future (at 
least) will be higher than before. The argument appears to carry an implicit assumption that, if the 
global entropy is in a low-entropy state on an entropy increasing trajectory, then any given sample 
of that system will overwhelmingly likely also parallel that state. This, in turn, assumes a sort of 
homogeneity to the global system. More particularly, this assumes (as with thermodynamics) that 
the global system is more of less in equilibrium and that there are no appreciable regional 
variations. As discussed above, such an assumption may be justified by the assertion that 
microstates are distributed in phase space in a fibrillated fashion. However, this argument is a little 
too qualitative.74 And even if it succeeds, it faces serious challenges at cosmic scales. While the 
cosmological principle asserts large-scale homogeneity, it is patently obvious that on local scales, 
such in our galaxy and on our planet, homogeneity is not given. Without a response to this 
objection, the Past Hypothesis fails to offer an explanation for why isolated systems obey the 
Second Law. This remains an open question. 
 
9.6 LOWER ENTROPY 
Earman (2006) also calls into question the empirical efficacy of the Past Hypothesis, arguing that if 
low entropy is a good initial condition, then lower would be better. And if this is taken too far, then 
the early universe would be so uniform that no structure could form (419). However, this argument 
does not work. Quantum mechanics provides a clear limit to how smooth the universe can become, 
due to quantum fluctuations. Indeed, it might be argued that the universe (evidenced by CMB 
                                                          
74 Neither Winsberg nor Albert offer quantitative arguments. 
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observations) was exactly as smooth as it could be, given the limitations imposed by the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle. 
 
9.7 IS THE PAST HYPOTHESIS NECESSARY? 
Earman (2006) makes another objection to the Past Hypothesis by suggesting that time-
asymmetric predictions do not require a remote-past boundary condition, but merely "information 
about the present and near past states that comes, for example, from a short temporal sequence of 
observations" (421). But this evades the question of what makes those assumptions valid? Indeed, 
in practice we trust our near past boundary conditions, but the point Albert makes is that any 
attempt to ground those presumptions leads to an infinite regress that is best terminated by 
imposing a boundary condition at the Big Bang. 
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10 ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
“But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you 
no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation” 
—Eddington (1927) 
 
This section reviews some alternative proposals addressing the low-entropy problem. These 
alternatives offer a different approach: they might be classed as dynamical solutions, as opposed to 
positing a boundary condition. 
 
10.1 CARROLL'S MULTIVERSE 
“[S]omewhere out there, inflation is still going on” 
—Carroll (2010 330) 
 
Carroll (2010) is unsatisfied with the Past Hypothesis. It makes no sense, he feels, “to assume from 
the start that the early universe must be small and dense. That's something we need to explain” 
(336). To this end, Carroll exploits some strange consequences of inflation theory to speculate an 
alternative to the Past Hypothesis—a dynamical explanation for the low-entropy condition of the 
early universe. The proposal is similar to Boltzmann's idea (his second proposal, mentioned above) 
that the observable universe comprises only a tiny region of an inconceivably large universe that 
globally (i.e., on vast scales) is at or close to equilibrium. The original idea conceived the observable 
universe to be the result of a fluctuation. However (as previously discussed), the low entropy of the 
early universe cannot be sensibly explained as a fluctuation from equilibrium. That is, even 
appealing to the anthropic principle to understand our current state, “we would only require a 
fluctuation in entropy large enough to allow for a single conscious observer, not an entire universe” 
(Carroll & Chen 2004 7). This (as we have seen) leads to the Boltzmann Brains paradox. 
 
Instead, Carroll avails himself of the latest cosmological theories and associated empirical evidence 
to develop a more elaborate and thoroughgoing account. Carroll & Chen (2004) ask themselves 
whether a fluctuation to an inflationary patch is more likely than one like the Big Bang sans 
inflation. As has already been discussed,75 the entropy of the universe before inflation was much 
lower than the period succeeding it: the Big Bang. They argue that, contrary to appearances, our 
                                                          
75 See calculations in Appendix. 
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early universe is not “‘chosen randomly’ in some measure on the space of initial conditions; rather, 
that it evolves via a fluctuation from a very specific pre-existing state, namely empty de Sitter” (26). 
 
To see how this works, imagine that the observable universe is only a tiny patch of a vast (possibly 
infinite) and largely empty universe, which Carroll calls the multiverse. Consider the initial state of 
this multiverse. According to Carroll, the natural (or, “generic”) state of the multiverse is almost-
empty de Sitter space76 with a small, positive cosmological constant. The presence of this small 
vacuum energy, he (Carroll & Chen 2004) asserts, “will tend to initially empty out to an 
approximate de Sitter vacuum” (5). This assertion is at least superficially borne out by the evidence. 
The observable universe appears77 to be entering an era of accelerated expansion due to the recent 
dominance of the cosmological constant. In accord with the Second Law, also, the universe appears 
bound to terminate in heat death. Reaching this state, the universe approximates the de Sitter space 
Carroll posits. Presumably, the universe would remain in this state indefinitely, for eons. Given this 
scenario, Carroll further claims that this “emptying-out of the universe under typical evolution of a 
generic state can actually provide appropriate initial conditions for the onset of inflation” (21). 
 
His argument is (roughly) as follows. Non-zero vacuum energy78 generates fluctuations with the 
potential to spawn the sort of low-entropy states that Boltzmann envisioned. However, Carroll does 
not consider these fluctuations alone. Importantly in his account, the universe is furnished with an 
inflaton field. Given such a field, de Sitter space is, Carroll argues, unstable. This space can fluctuate 
in ways not envisioned by Boltzmann. Given enough time, thermal fluctuations of the inflaton field 
in a small patch of the multiverse can instigate the onset of spontaneous inflation, generating 
exponential expansion, which quickly dominates (29). Non-uniform decay of this false vacuum 
leads to bubbles: areas of exponential expansion surrounded by empty, true-vacuum de Sitter 
space. This process was discussed earlier: it leads to eternal inflation. Carroll asserts that our 
observable universe is one of these bubbles in a vast and exponentially-expanding multiverse. 
 
The fate of these true-vacuum bubbles is key to Carroll’s proposal. A bubble may dissipate back into 
the thermal surroundings of the multiverse; or it may (according to Carroll) combine with a 
simultaneous fluctuation of the inflaton field to generate a wormhole, which disconnects the bubble 
from the surrounding multiverse (much like the formation of a black hole). Once disconnected, as 
just mentioned, a bubble starts life in an unstable false-vacuum energy state. Under certain 
conditions, Carroll (2010) argues that this decay serves to convert the false-vacuum energy into 
                                                          
76 Roughly, de Sitter space is the vacuum solution to the Einstein field equations (thus empty), with a positive 
cosmological constant (thus, expanding). 
77 For a review of this evidence, see, for instance, the paper by Astier & Pain (2012). 
78 This is a consequence of quantum mechanics. In particular, the Gibbons–Hawking effect associates a temperature to 
empty (de Sitter) space. In other words, empty space has a non-zero minimum energy, generating fluctuations.  
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matter and radiation. We thus proceed through the requisite inflation period and subsequent Big 
Bang to arrive at “a hot, dense, smooth, expanding space” (331). 
 
Outside these bubbles, the false vacuum patches continue to expand exponentially. Given the 
appropriate decay rate, this allows for eternal inflation and an infinite set of bubble universes. Thus, 
rare but ineluctable fluctuations in the multiverse spawn innumerable baby universes, sometimes 
giving birth to universes of low entropy, such as the one we inhabit. Carroll purports to circumvent 
the need to explain why we find ourselves in a universe far from thermal equilibrium by suggesting 
that no equilibrium state exists: “It becomes natural to observe entropy increasing, simply because 
entropy can always increase” (361). The apparent special (low-entropy) condition of our early 
universe is thus accounted for by the fact it spawned from a vast high-entropy multiverse. This 
process does not, Carroll argues, violate the Second Law: the entropy of the multiverse is 
unbounded. Entropy in the multiverse increases symmetrically in both temporal directions79 ad 
infinitum, with no maximal entropy. Without any equilibrium state and without any defined initial 
state, the initial conditions of our pocket universe are relative and arbitrary—thus obviating the 
need for a Past Hypothesis. 
 
10.2 PROBLEMS WITH THE MULTIVERSE 
Carroll argues that the multiverse is not just some fancy; rather, it is entailed by (some versions of) 
the inflation model. Whether this is indeed the case, and whether the inflation model itself is 
supported by empirical evidence, the question remains: does this proposal account for our low-
entropy universe? A number of objections have been raised. 
 
10.2.1 Boltzmann Brains (again) 
As Carroll (2010) admits, “life could certainly exist in a universe with a much higher entropy” (333). 
Indeed, the multiverse comprises “both isolated Boltzmann brains lurking in the empty de Sitter 
regions, and ordinary observers found in the aftermath of the low-entropy beginnings of the baby 
universes. Indeed, there should be an infinite number of both types” (363). The concern is that, 
when comparing universes able to support intelligent life, the relative probabilities (if we can make 
sense of these infinities) weigh heavily in favor of universes radically different from the one we 
observe. This unfortunate consequence assails the invocation of the anthropic principle (mentioned 
previously). By eliminating the Past Hypothesis, Carroll’s multiverse appears to be similarly 
susceptible to the same specter as Boltzmann's original hypothesis: the overwhelming 
preponderance of Boltzmann Brains. Carroll (2006) himself, articulates the problem thus: 
                                                          
79 In this model, Carroll & Chen (2004) contend, “inflation occurs asymptotically both forwards and backwards in time, 
implying a universe that is (statistically) time-symmetric on ultra-large scales” (27). 
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“[W]hat we actually have access to are the positions and momenta of the photons that 
are currently reaching our telescopes. And the fact is, given all of the possible past 
histories of the universe consistent with those photons reaching us, in the vast majority 
of them the impression that we are observing an even-lower-entropy past is an accident. 
If all pasts consistent with our current macrostate are equally likely, there are many 
more in which the past was a chaotic mess, in which a vast conspiracy gave rise to our 
false impression that the past was orderly. In other words, if we ask “What kind of early 
universe tends to naturally evolve into what we see?”, the answer is the ordinary smooth 
and low-entropy Big Bang. But here we are asking “What do most of the states that 
could possibly evolve into our current universe look like?”, and the answer there is a 
chaotic high-entropy mess.”  
 
To be sure, Carroll & Chen (2004) offer a potential solution to this problem by asserting that 
“fluctuations into eternal inflation dominate over those into a conventional Big Bang" (26). The 
assertion here is that “a lot more observers arise as the baby universes grow and cool toward 
equilibrium than come about through random fluctuations in empty space" (364). However, it is not 
clear how this can be shown quantitatively.80 I am not sure how this problem is significantly 
different to the original Boltzmann Brain paradox. 
 
10.2.2 Unfalsifiable 
Further, Carroll's multiverse is subject to charges that it is unfalsifiable. Wald (2006) complains 
that no predictions are made (397). For instance, "each bubble, evolving separately from all the 
rest, evolves as a universe unto itself" (331). Carroll (2010) himself admits, “it’s not enough to draw 
fun pictures of universes branching off in both directions of time; we need to understand things at a 
quantitative level well enough to make reliable predictions” (364). But it is not possible to make 
predictions about initial conditions in this model, as "local manifestations of the laws of physics will 
vary from universe to universe" (332).  So, it appears that any attempt at testing this hypothesis are 
in vain. Worse, this account entails that everything that can happen, will happen. So, the hypothesis 
lacks explanatory power. 
 
10.2.3 Unnecessary 
The multiverse generates a great deal of structure and relies upon a lot of speculation to recover an 
explanation for the Second Law. Winsberg (2012) suggests that this is a high price to pay. While 
cognizant of certain outstanding problems with the Past Hypothesis, he feels these are not 
“insurmountable problems that require radical cosmological solutions" (398). He argues that 
Carroll’s multiverse should offer "a coherent picture that is compelling, and that tells us something 
                                                          
80 Carroll & Chen (2004) offer the following suggestive argument: “it is easier for a single mode of wavelength H−1 e to 
fluctuate up its potential than for a large collection of modes to simultaneously fluctuate into a configuration describing a 
radiation-dominated Robertson Walker universe” (26). 
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interesting about the history of the cosmos" (398). Otherwise, he doesn’t think these problems 
warrant the additional structure of a multiverse. However, given the abovementioned problems 
with the multiverse and its patent lack of predictive power, it is not obvious what benefits are to be 
enjoyed by adhering to this proposition. Unless a better response can be offered for the Boltzmann 
Brains problem, it may be preferable to revert to the Past Hypothesis. 
 
10.3 CYCLIC UNIVERSE 
Early-universe inflation is the prevailing theory accounting for the aforementioned anomalies of the 
Big Bang model. However, it has yet to secure empirical support. Until detection of the appropriate 
B-modes (by, say, the Planck satellite), non-inflation models remain viable alternatives. Having 
discussed some of the problems with inflation theory with respect to the low-entropy problem, 
including Carroll’s idea above, it is worth reviewing an alternative, propounded by Paul Steinhardt, 
et al.: the Cyclic model.81 
 
Questioning the efficacy and scientific value82 of inflationary models, Steinhardt proposes an 
alternative model based on the old idea of a cyclical universe: one that expands from a Big Bang and 
collapses to a Big Crunch, and then repeats the cycle, possibly eternally.83 Steinhart (2011) argues 
that this better accounts for the aforementioned problems that inflation theory is meant to solve. 
 
What is relevant here, though, is his response to questions about entropy. Specifically, how does 
Steinhart respond to the charge that a cyclic universe is bedeviled by the threat of an ever-
increasing entropy? Assuming each cycle begins with more entropy than the previous (unless one 
argues that the process is reversible), and given that the universe is engaged in an infinite cycle of 
bang and crunch, what explains the relatively low entropy of the early universe? 
 
In one attempt at addressing this concern, Steinhardt and Turok (2002) suggest that due to the 
cosmic acceleration caused by the cosmological constant, from the horizon of any observer, entropy 
will appear to have reverted to a low value at the instantiation of a new universe. This acceleration, 
they argue, “is crucial in establishing the flat and vacuous initial conditions required for ekpyrosis 
                                                          
81 See, for instance, Steinhardt & Turok (2002) and Steinhardt & Turok (2004). 
82 For instance, Steinhardt (2011) asks: “What does it mean to say that inflation makes certain predictions—that, for 
example, the universe is uniform or has scale-invariant fluctuations—if anything that can happen will happen an infinite 
number of times? And if the theory does not make testable predictions, how can cosmologists claim that the theory agrees 
with observations, as they routinely do?” (42). 
83 Roughly, the Cyclic model predicts that the current accelerated expansion of the universe will eventually reverse. 
Steinhardt (2011) suggests about a trillion years. This explains why we have not yet been able to measure this 
deceleration.  
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and for removing the entropy, black holes, and other debris produced in the preceding cycle.” That 
is, from the purview of an observer in one of these cyclic universes (within, that is, their co-moving 
patch), the high-entropy of previous cycles are not observable. 
 
As with Carroll’s multiverse, the Cyclic model demands a great deal of possibly untestable structure 
in order to accommodate a dynamical explanation for the Second Law. How can such a hypothesis 
be tested? How can we measure evidence of a previous crunch? Steinhardt (2011) argues that it is, 
at least in principle, a testable theorem84: 
 
“Smoothing during contraction has an observable consequence. During any smoothing 
phase, whether in inflationary theory or in the cyclic theory, quantum fluctuations 
generate small, propagating random distortions in spacetime, known as gravitational 
waves, that leave a distinctive imprint on the microwave background radiation. The 
amplitude of the waves is proportional to the energy density. Inflation would occur when 
the universe was extremely dense, whereas the equivalent process in the cyclic model 
would occur when the universe was practically empty, so the predicted imprints would 
be dramatically different” (43). 
 
As shall be discussed below, it is questionable whether this additional theoretical baggage is 
warranted. Physics (or, more properly, physicists) may indeed furnish us with a more “natural” 
explanation for the low-entropy past (or indeed, present). Much of the above discussion seems to 
falter at the edge of accepted contemporary theories, such as GR and gravity. 
  
                                                          
84 In fact, the cyclic model predicts significantly diminished (in fact, practically undetectable) gravitational waves, 
compared to inflation models. 
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11 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 
“[T]he subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and enquiry” 
—Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 
 
Previous sections addressed the technical difficulties in developing a fundamental description of 
the Second Law and reviewed some problems of, and innovative solutions to, extending this 
account to the universe. This section addresses more general concerns about the nature of scientific 
explanation and relates these concerns to the solutions mentioned above. This section asks, what 
counts as a scientific explanation? How can one assess, evaluate and compare competing 
explanations? A promising response by Loewer et al. (2012a) is assessed. 
 
11.1 PROBABILITY 
“Everything existing in the universe is the fruit of chance and necessity.”  
― Democritus 
 
Probability frames much of the discussion around fundamental explanations of the Second Law and 
a low-entropy past. Relying heavily on probability theory means tackling issues about objective and 
subjective probability, justification for the Indifference Principle, and so on. Notwithstanding more 
general concerns about the nature of probability itself, it is worth addressing its specific application 
in statistical mechanics. Specifically, what does it mean to say that a macrostate evolves 
probabilistically? How are the probabilities to be interpreted? At first blush, it might appear (and 
many have contended that) determinism and chance85 are incompatible. Yet, statistical mechanics 
generates probabilistic conclusions from deterministic dynamics. Whence does this 
indeterminism86 arise? Is it simply due to ignorance of the observer (epistemic)? Or are these ontic 
probabilities associated with the physical system. 
 
                                                          
85 Chance being objective probability. 
86 While (for simplicity) only classical descriptions of statistical mechanics are considered here, these arguments translate 
more-or-less unadulterated to a quantum mechanical version. Quantum mechanics allows for the introduction of a 
different type of probability. Indeed, quantum mechanical probabilities may even serve to replace the probabilities arising 
from coarse-graining, discussed here. However, construal of the probabilities that arise in quantum mechanics is hotly 
debated. It is far from clear that it can obviate the need for a Past Hypothesis. One possible exception is the Ghirardi 
Rimini Weber (GRW) interpretation. Albert (2000) offers a rough sketch of how GRW may introduce time-asymmetry to 
statistical mechanics. 
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Let’s review the kind of probabilities that arise when discussing statistical-mechanical entropy. 
Classically, the state of a system is fully described by a point in phase-space. Along with a set of 
dynamical laws, this information suffices to predict the evolution (the trajectory in phase-space) of 
that system. But without infinite precision, we cannot resolve phase-space points per se. Practically, 
of course, infinite precision is not possible. We can only know that the state is one amongst a set of 
microstates. That set depends upon the coarse graining of the phase-space, but whatever size 
volume we choose, such a choice introduces ignorance into the picture. As such, a probabilistic 
description is required.87 Phase-space can thus be thought of as a probability space, carved-up into 
equal volumes, each with equal probability; or, carved-up into regions with vastly different 
probabilities. Probabilities are necessary to account for that uncertainty, to express our ignorance 
of aspects of the system. And those probabilities88 are responsible for the emergence of entropy in 
any practical description of a system.  
 
As this Boltzmannian concept of entropy relies upon coarse-graining, it might be suggested that, in 
principle, given an accurate microscopic description of the world (at least, in classical terms), the 
concept of entropy evaporates. The thought here is that these probabilities are not objective, but 
rather just a reflection of our ignorance of the microscopic details of the system. Of course, entropy 
is, in part, a measure of our ignorance of a system. However, as Albert (2000) has forcefully argued, 
the claim that these probabilities are simply subjective is absurd: 
"Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary, that it is somehow a priori, 
that the particles that make up the material world must arrange themselves in accord 
with what we know, with what we happen to have looked into? Can anybody seriously 
think that our merely being ignorant of the exact microconditions of thermodynamic 
systems plays some part in bringing about, in making it the case, that (say) milk 
dissolves in coffee?" (64). 
 
Systems exhibit entropy-increasing behavior regardless of the information any observer might have 
about that system. Measuring the entropy of a system reveals an inherent state property of that 
system. This probabilistic account relates to the macroscopic phenomena that comprise our 
observations and experiments. As Rovelli (2014) takes care to emphasize, the sort of probability 
that arises here “does not refer to the evolution of matter itself. It relates to the evolution of those 
specific quantities we interact with” (55). That is, thermodynamic quantities, such as temperature 
and pressure. “Heat is linked to probability; and probability in turn is linked to the fact that our 
interactions with the world do not register the fine details of reality” (60). 
                                                          
87 Quantum mechanics introduces uncertainly at a fundamental level: even in principle, one cannot know the exact state 
of the system. 
88 This ignorance interpretation of these statistical-mechanical properties should not be confounded with a more 
fundamental indeterminism. Notwithstanding a quantum-mechanical construal (which introduces a somewhat different 
kind of probability), these probabilities confer no indeterminism on the microscopic system itself. 
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Does one commit a category error by talking of the likeliness of a low-entropy early universe? 
Standard probability theory in statistical mechanics bears severe strain when extended to the 
cosmic scale. From our purview, the observable universe is a unique and incomparable event, 
which makes quantifying its likeliness difficult. Given the paucity of data, it is reasonable to 
question any assessment of expected or typical initial conditions of the universe. Yet, if such 
assessments supervene on our best theories, I believe this approach is warranted. It is all we have 
to go by. To be sure, current theories breakdown subject to the extreme conditions of the early 
universe. So, current estimations of likeliness are likely to fall far of the mark. 
 
11.2 BEST SYSTEM ACCOUNT 
In defining physical laws, we seek to capture regularities of the world. There are two kinds of laws, 
properly construed: governing laws that somehow effect the evolution of physical systems; and 
summary laws that offer a best account of systems, based on certain principles, such as simplicity. 
Following Loewer (2012a), we explore the latter kind. 
 
Loewer (2012a) suggests we should evaluate our laws and theories based not only on how well 
they capture empirical data but also on how well they accord with our sense of simplicity and 
usefulness. Loewer takes his lead from David Lewis. Lewis interpreted laws not as powers 
governing nature, but rather an expression of our best summary of the patterns and regularities we 
observe in the universe. Lewis called this understanding of laws a Best System Account (BSA). This 
approach explicitly assumes a Humean purview. Loewer argues that the “Humean mosaic” (or, state 
of the world, comprising a space-time topology containing elementary particles, etc.) is thus 
described and explained by the best theories we can muster. According to this approach, a theory is 
a Best System Account (a theory that best describes our world) just in case it offers what Callender 
(2004) describes as “the greatest balance of simplicity and strength” (207). 
 
Such an approach might depend on the domain of application. For instance, a macroscopic system 
could, in theory, be described by tracing the evolution of each of its microscopic constituents. But 
apart from the shear complexity and impracticality of such a project, such a description would fail 
to capture the sort of characteristics of the system that are important and useful to us. Probability, 
on the other hand, offers a useful summary of the system by radically reducing the complexity of 
the description: offering greater generality and power with the attendant loss of information. 
Callender (2004) explains the objective as follows: 
“We try to find the simplest most powerful generalizations we can. Dynamical laws like 
Newton's second law are highly prized: they are remarkably strong and simple. Still, 
there are many patterns detectable in the world not derivable from such laws, e.g. the 
entirety of thermodynamics. So we might also introduce some special science laws and 
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probabilistic laws to capture even more generalizations. These moves will allow us to 
deduce regularities such as entropy increase” (208). 
 
For example, as Wallace (2011) notes, an exact description of the microstate of the world (even if it 
were possible) would not serve as a useful summary (5). What we want is a macroscopic 
description, whereby interesting behavior emerges (i.e., entropic increase). 
 
Equipped with a set of dynamical laws, a statistical postulate and the Past Hypothesis—which 
together Loewer (2012a) coined the Mentaculus—the claim is that the Mentaculus accounts for the 
Second Law of thermodynamics and its attendant asymmetries. It does this by assigning a 
probability distribution to all possible initial states of the universe: almost zero probability (due to 
the Past Hypothesis) to any initial macrostate that is not low-entropy and a uniform probability 
over the remaining states. 
 
Adherence to the governance view of physical laws may leave one uncomfortable in promoting the 
Past Hypothesis to a law. Being non-dynamical, it seems to be a different kind of law to those of 
Newton. The Past Hypothesis is merely a boundary condition. Worse, it is highly untypical. 
Subscription, however, to the BSA allows for a different view. As Loewer (2012a) remarks, the Past 
Hypothesis “increases the informativeness [of the physical description] enormously (it entails the 
second law) with little cost in simplicity. So on the BSA it qualifies as a law” (118). Callender (2004) 
agrees that, “since the Past Hypothesis is so fantastically powerful and simply state-able, it seems 
likely that the Best System would include the Past State as one of its axioms” (208). In contrast, the 
Carroll’s hypothesis does not meet the BSA criteria. The multiverse is significantly more complex 
and the gains in explanatory power uncertain. Not to mention the predictive power of the theory, 
which is arguably nil. 
 
So, despite the abovementioned problems with Boltzmann’s microscopic account of the Second 
Law, reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. Furnished with a Past Hypothesis (the Mentaculus 
package), his account remains in rude health. 
 
11.3 IS AN EXPLANATION REQUIRED? 
To date, explanations of our low-entropy early universe without the Past Hypothesis have been 
found wanting. If the fundamental dynamical laws are indeed time symmetric, then it seems the 
observed asymmetries of the universe must originate in a low-entropy boundary condition. This, at 
least, has been the conclusion reached by many. However, this immediately poses a further 
question about where this boundary condition arose. Notwithstanding the abovementioned 
concerns with regard to the empirical adequacy of the Past Hypothesis, there remains a continuing 
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debate over the legitimacy of the Past Hypothesis as explanatory device. Is any further explanation 
required? 
 
Opinions are divided. Many believe the apparent unlikeliness of this initial condition demands 
explanation. Price (2004) argues that the low-entropy early universe should be counted as an 
extremely unlikely event and that this "anomaly" demands an explanation. Indeed, according to 
statistical mechanics, such a low-entropy state is extremely unlikely. For instance, Carroll (2011), 
calculates that the early universe “was in one of 1010
88
 different states. But it could have been in 
any of 1010
120
 possible states that are accessible to the universe” (301). Obviously, viewed this way, 
and assuming the initial state was chosen randomly, the instantiation of our universe was a 
ridiculously improbable event. It is thus reasonable to conclude, as does Carroll, that the “state of 
the early universe was not chosen randomly among all possible states” (301). 
 
But what does it mean to say that a low-entropy early universe is unlikely? Construed correctly, the 
Past Hypothesis is not subject to the statistical postulate. To ask whether or not the Past Hypothesis 
is unlikely is therefore a category error. Put differently, one could argue that the likeliness or 
otherwise of the initial conditions is a category error, as there is only one universe. Is it meaningful 
to talk about probabilities when assessing a single datum: the observable universe? Any such talk 
about the unlikeliness of the initial conditions of the universe (such as the sort of calculation made 
by Carroll above) suggests that implicit a priori assumptions are being made: some yard stick with 
which to make comparisons. Such an approach does not call on empirical evidence and appears to 
resort to metaphysical presumptions. It is these hidden assumptions Callender (2012) attacks: 
"I think that most of the fine-tuning arguments one sees are nonsense. The idea is 
something like: a physical parameter P is finely tuned iff the probability of P taking a 
value compatible with life is low. Its low probability is then supposed to call for 
explanation via new physics. Forget the vagueness of what we mean by 'life.' That's a 
serious problem, but a deeper one is that we typically have no warranted probability 
metrics to support these judgments. Where are these judgments of unlikeliness coming 
from?" (1) 
 
Without evidence to the contrary (the Past Hypothesis is falsifiable), is it not appropriate to simply 
accept this special condition as a contingent fact about our universe? 
 
However, there is a problem with this conclusion. By describing the low-entropy condition as 
merely contingent, this seems to belie the immutability that cosmologists ascribe this assumption. 
Price (2004) explains: 
"As actually used in contemporary cosmology, the hypothesis of the smooth early 
universe is not like this. It is taken to be projectible, in the sense that everyone expects 
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it and its consequences (e.g., the existence of galaxies) to continue to hold, as we look 
further and further out into space. The hypothesis is thus being accorded a law-like 
status, rather than treated as something that 'just happens'" (233). 
 
Indeed, it is this law-like status that Price speaks of, rather than contingency, that seems to capture 
the spirit of the Past Hypothesis. Similarly, Albert (2000) argues that the Past Hypothesis “cannot 
possibly be the sort of fact that we know, or ever will know, in the way we know of straightforward 
everyday particular empirical facts. We know it differently, then. Our grounds for believing it turn 
out to be more like our grounds for believing general theoretical laws. Our grounds (that is) are 
inductive, our grounds have to do with the fact that the proposition that the universe came into 
being in an enormously low-entropy macrocondition turns out to be enormously helpful in making 
an enormous variety of empirical predictions” (94). 
 
Winsberg (2012) suggests that the Past Hypothesis mitigates against a skeptical paradox. “It is,” he 
argues, “a condition for the possibility of our having knowledge of the past, and hence for the 
possibility of having knowledge of physics at all—once we have adopted the rest of the standard 
package. The standard picture without the Past Hypothesis is consistent with my present 
observational base, but it is epistemologically unstable." (397).  
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12 CONCLUSION 
“Let strife divide you, it is too early for a pact” 
 – Schiller, to scientists and philosophers89 
 
This paper has been motivated by a desire to understand the impact of modern cosmology on the 
problem of accounting for the Second Law of thermodynamics. The Second Law is not a 
fundamental law of nature, yet there is consensus that it reveals something important about the 
world that our best fundamental laws to date fail to capture. As we have seen, the statistical 
mechanical reduction of thermodynamics remains a work in progress. Alone it fails to resolve the 
anomaly of the low-entropy state of our universe. 
 
While modern cosmology offers deeper insights into the nature of entropy, it has yet to underwrite 
an adequate generalized description of entropic behavior. Positing some sort of early universe low-
entropy boundary condition appears to be the appropriate way of fixing this anomaly. However, 
asserting something like the Past Hypothesis as a law-like brute fact remains controversial and 
leaves unanswered questions about the origin of the low-entropy state. And attempts at a 
dynamical solution to the low-entropy early universe have been found wanting. As we have seen, 
Carroll prefers to explain the low-entropy initial condition by positing a vast multiverse, which 
obviates the notion of a boundary condition. This audacious speculation suffers from a number of 
technical difficulties, mentioned previously, that may not be surmountable. Even if the math works 
out, the multiverse makes demands that are unpalatable to some. Callender (2004), for instance, 
questions the validity of introducing unobservable realms. He asks, are other “universes” part of 
science if they can never be observed? And how are we to evaluate such apparently unfalsifiable 
models? Of course, these arguments depend upon one's view of scientific explanation. 
 
In summary, the low-entropy puzzle remains unsolved, but much progress has been made since 
Boltzmann et al. first recognized the problem. As it stands, I think the Past Hypothesis does not 
adequately address the demands of a scientific explanation unless it is afforded law-like status. But, 
as Carroll complains, this seems ad hoc. And it seems too hasty to promote the Past Hypothesis thus 
without first better understanding the physics of the early universe and of entropy itself. To be 
sure, the Past Hypothesis may survive a theory of everything (including, for instance, quantum 
gravity), but this should not serve as a reason to foreclose the search for a deeper explanation of 
entropy. Intuitively, one may wish to allow further investigation for a more fundamental dynamical 
explanation. A new physical theory (quantum gravity, for instance) may reveal as yet unfathomed 
curiosities about the world that shed new light on entropy—affording deeper insight or revealing 
                                                          
89 Boltzmann (1904 172). 
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the puzzle of low entropy to be a pseudo-problem. Finally, a better understanding of entropy may 
depend on our interpretation of quantum mechanics and probability (e.g., GRW90) and our 
understanding of the behavior of gravity under extreme conditions. I concur with the intuition of 
Price (2004), "that there is an important explanatory project here, that there is likely to be 
something interesting to find" (238). 
  
                                                          
90 A GRW interpretation may inform on the kind of probabilities involved in statistical mechanics and provide an 
asymmetric dynamics, but cannot of itself explain initial low entropy. 
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13 APPENDIX 
13.1 CARNOT ENGINE 
Carnot conceived of an ideal reversible thermodynamic process (comprising adiabatic and 
isothermal phases): the Carnot engine. 
 
While his work preceded the formalization of thermodynamics, Carnot could rely upon the 
principle of energy conservation: energy is neither created nor destroyed, only converted from one 
type of energy to another (from heat to work, for instance). The First Law of thermodynamics 
embodies this principle, stating that any change in the internal energy, dU, of a system is simply the 
sum of any heat added, δQ, and any work done, δW, on the system91: 
𝑑𝑈 =  𝛿𝑄 +  𝛿𝑊  
 
This formulation relates the concept of molecular level energy (heat) to mechanical energy (work). 
Or, “heat is work and work is heat” (as per the song by Flanders and Swann). So, for a cyclic (i.e., 
reversible) process: 
0 =  𝛿𝑄 +  𝛿𝑊 
 
Invoking the principle of energy conservation, or the First Law of thermodynamics, the maximum 
useful work produced during the cycle, W, is the amount of heat converted to work: 
W = Qhot - Qcold 
 
Defining the efficiency of the engine, η, as the ratio of useful work generated to heat supplied, then: 





And, for a Carnot engine,  




    =  
𝑄ℎ𝑜𝑡  −  𝑄𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑄ℎ𝑜𝑡
 
                                                          
91 Note that heat and work are not state properties, unlike internal energy. 
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Applying the Ideal Gas equation, Carnot demonstrated that the efficiency of the Carnot engine (and 
thus, any reversible heat engine) is a function only of the absolute temperatures of the heat 
reservoirs (Thot and Tcold) involved: 





Perfect efficiency (η = 1) is achieved only if the absolute temperature of the rejected heat, Tcold, is 
zero. This is not possible. Thus, even an ideal engine cannot achieve perfect efficiency—some 
energy must be wasted. 
 
13.2 CLAUSIUS ENTROPY 
Following the work of Carnot, Clausius noted (from above) that: 
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Where S is a conserved quantity (constant). The Carnot cycle is a reversible process, returning to its 






That is, S is a state function. 92 Clausius called this state function, entropy. For a reversible process: 





For irreversible processes, entropy is not conserved. Clausius formulated the relation between 
entropy change, dS, and heat, 𝛿𝑄, for a given absolute temperature93, T: 






𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑡 – 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑  >  0 
 
Clausius formulated his postulate thus: A transformation whose only result is to transfer heat from 
a body at a given temperature to a body at higher temperature is impossible. 
 
Consider, for example, a cup of hot coffee cooling. Below is a simplified calculation of the change in 
entropy of the system, comprising coffee and environment, dS: 
dScoffee = -dQcoffee/Thot 
dSenv = dQenv/Tcold 
dS = dScoffee + dSenv 
= -dQcoffee/Thot + dQenv/Tcold 
Thot > Tcold 
                                                          
92 Internal energy and pressure are also state quantities because they describe the state of a system, irrespective of how 
the system reached that state. In contrast, work and heat are not state quantities because their values depend on the 
specific transition between states. 
93 Note that we have not defined temperature here. This is the purport of the Zeroth Law of thermodynamics. 
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∴ dS > 0 
 
13.3 THERMODYNAMIC ENTROPY CALCULATIONS 
Consider a box of volume 2V, partitioned into two equal volumes. A dilute gas fills one side of the 
partition. When the partition is removed, the gas spontaneously disperses (spreads out) to fill the 
whole box. This is an irreversible process: work can be done as the gas disperses (for instance, it 
could act against a piston). But once spread, the gas cannot do any more work. For an ideal gas, the 
change in entropy between two the states is solved thus: 
dU  = dQ + dW (1st Law) 
dW = -PdV 
dU = dQ - PdV 
dS   = dQ/T  (2nd Law) 
 
Combining: 
dU  = TdS - PdV 
 
This inequality is satisfied when the action of the system is spontaneous. So, if the partition 
between sides A and B is removed, then the gas disperses to fill A + B with volume 2V and pressure 
P/2. The energy of the system has not changed (dU = 0): 
0    = TdS - PV 
dS  = PV/T  (i.e., dS is positive)  
 
Using Ideal Gas Law: 
 PV  = nRT 










        = nR [ln (2V) - ln (V)] 
  = nR ln (2) 
 
But the reverse process (dV = -V) violates the Second Law: 
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0    = TdS – P(-V) 
dS  = -PV/T (i.e., dS is negative)  
 
This violates the Second Law. So, this is not a spontaneous process. 
 
13.4 THE MAXWELL–BOLTZMANN DISTRIBUTION 
The Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution describes the probability distribution for the magnitude of 
the velocity of particles in an idealized gas at thermal equilibrium. Assuming the gas comprises 
many molecules (of the order of Avogadro's number), one can obtain the probability density 
function, f, for finding a particle about a given velocity, v, at temperature, T:  
𝑓(𝑣) = 𝐴 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑣2/𝑇) 
 
where A is a constant. The most probable distribution of velocities for such a system is the Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution94. 




This can also be expressed as the distribution of energy, as: 




Where E is the kinetic energy of the system. This (Gaussian) distribution is constant for a given 
temperature and is thus associated with the equilibrium state of the system. 
 
13.5 H-THEOREM 
The choice of ideal gas (that is, dilute, monotonic, constant energy, constant number of particles, 
etc.) allows for a number of assumptions. Boltzmann considered the kinetics of ideal (elastic) 
binary (only two-body) particle collisions. The result of such collisions would depend on angle of 
                                                          
94 In practice, this particular distribution is rare. Other distributions, such as Bose-Einstein condensate, are more 
apposite. However, the concept remains the same. 
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incidence, etc. Boltzmann made a key assumption known as the Stoßzahlansatz95 (molecular chaos 
assumption), that during any collision event in the gas, the two particles participating in the 
collision have 1) independently chosen kinetic energies from the distribution, 2) independent 
velocity directions, 3) independent starting points. Under these assumptions, Boltzmann 
constructed his kinetic equation (Boltzmann's equation). 
 
Boltzmann's account of microscopic particles involves determining what occurs when such 
particles interact. Employing µ-space representation, a system of N particles, each with a set of 
coordinates in position and momentum, has a density function, f(q, p), that describes the density of 
particles within a region of that µ-space. Thus, a volume, d3q d3p, contains dN particles. And the 
number of particles in a given region is obtained96 by integrating over each of the six dimensions of 
µ-space: 
𝑁 = ∭ 𝑑3𝑞 ∭ 𝑑3𝑝 𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝)  
 
To obtain the rate of change of f(q, p), the partial differential equation, df/dt, is: 
df/dt = (df/dt)external + (df/dt)position + (df/dt)collision 
 
This is known as Boltzmann's transport equation. Given the assumptions mentioned in this paper, 
Boltzmann demonstrates that this system has a unique equilibrium state, the Maxwell-Boltzmann 
distribution, at a local minimum, i.e., when df/dt = 0. Boltzmann defined H such that H is at a 
minimum when the particles have a Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. If the particles are 
distributed in some other way, then the value of H will be higher. Defining: 
 𝐻 ≡ ∭ 𝑑𝑞 ∭ 𝑑𝑝 𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓(𝑞, 𝑝) 
 
He proposes the theorem: if f(q, p) is a (sufficiently well-behaved) solution of Boltzmann transport 
equation, then it can be shown that: 
dH
dt
≤  0 
 
                                                          
95 Note: In many cases the molecular chaos assumption is highly accurate, and the ability to discard complex correlations 
between particles makes calculations much simpler. 
96 For simplicity’s sake, other assumptions are made, such as all particles having the same mass. 
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Boltzmann thus proves that the continual process of collisions causes the quantity H to decrease 
until it has reached a minimum. 
 
13.6 µ-SPACE 
A classical particle has three spatial degrees of freedom accounting for its position and a further 
three degrees of freedom accounting for its momentum. The state of a single particle can thus be 
described by a point on an abstract, 6-dimensional state space, or µ-space (mu-space). This is a 
useful representation of the microscopic configuration of a classical system. A system with N 
particles, for instance, has N points in µ-space, describing the instantaneous state of that system. 
Further, the temporal evolution of the system is represented by lines (trajectories) on the space for 
each of those particles. 
 
13.7 PHASE-SPACE 
Similar to µ-space, phase-space (or sometimes, Γ-space) represents the microscopic configuration 
of a system. In this case, though, a system comprising N particles is fully described by a 6N-
dimensional state space. That is, the dimensionality of the phase-space expresses the degrees of 
freedom of the entire system. A single point on this space represents the instantaneous 
configuration of the entire system. Temporal evolution of the system is represented by a line 
(trajectory) on phase-space. Note that, for deterministic Newtonian mechanics, the trajectories of 
different systems will never cross. This fact is pertinent when discussing Liouville's theorem. 
 
13.8 LEBESGUE MEASURE 
In the context of classical mechanics (considered here), the number of microstates compatible with 
a macrostate is uncountably infinite.97 The Lebesgue measure solves the problem of infinities of 
microstates by assigning a metric to a state space. It is an extension from normal measures that 
cover one, two or three dimensions (length, area, volume). Thus, a volume can be defined that 
contains a set of macroscopically indistinguishable microstates. It is considered to be the unique 
and natural measure for such systems. In particular, it is the only phase-space measure preserved 
(invariant) under Hamiltonian dynamics. 
 
Note that Boltzmann’s application of the Lebesgue measure to define entropy introduces an 
assumption (or postulate) about the proportionality of the state space. Specifically, Boltzmann 
                                                          
97 Things are not so bad in quantum mechanics due to its discrete nature imposed by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. 
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necessarily postulates a relation between the Lebesgue volume and the probability of the system 
being in a state associated with that volume. 
 
The Lebesgue measure yields verifiable predictions for the standard (non-gravitational) version of 
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. So, its choice is justified by empirical success. However, it is 
hotly debated whether this (or any) measure can be extended to more general conditions, such as 
systems that include the effects of gravity. 
 
13.9 LIOUVILLE'S THEOREM 
Liouville's theorem is employed in classical statistical mechanics to constrain the evolution of 
volumes of phase-space. The theorem states that these volumes are conserved through Hamiltonian 
evolution. That is, the number of microstates compatible with the associated volume cannot 
increase or decrease. 
 
This elucidates an important aspect of entropy. As previously mentioned, entropy is a state 
property.  However, as we see here, entropy is a property of the macroscopic system. At 
microscopic resolution, entropy is no longer a property of the system. This makes sense, as the 
property of time-reversibility is lost at microscopic granularity. It is only by applying the method of 
coarse graining (that is, losing information about system by viewing the system macroscopically) 
do the properties of entropy emerge. Instead of working with points of phase space, which is 
continuous and thus infinite, we work with a coarse graining of that space. This works classically by 
arbitrary definition of such unitary volumes. Quantum mechanically, the natural volume would be 
delimited by the uncertainty principle—that is, by Planck’s constant. 
 
In both cases, there is an unavoidable limit to our access to information about the microscopic state 
of a system. So, while the consequences of Liouville’s theorem stand, it remains moot with regard to 
entropy. It is always necessary to substitute points in phase-space with blobs of phase-space, with 
the attendant inescapable loss of information about the system. 
 
13.10 BOLTZMANN ENTROPY CALCULATIONS 
For example, consider a box with a barrier (an impermeable partition, say) in the middle, such that 
each side, A and B, have equal volume V. At time, t0, let A contain a gas of N molecules at 
equilibrium. Let B contain no gas (vacuum). At this time, the entropy of A is maximal for its given 
constraints (volume, temperature, etc.). Trivially, B has an entropy of zero (assuming we are 
considering here just gas particle entropy with respect to position and momentum). If, at t1, the 
barrier is quickly removed, then at that instant the entropy of the combined volume of A + B = 2V 
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will be the same as before, i.e., SA + B = SA. The system is in a low-entropy state, that is, not at 
equilibrium. Given a certain relaxation time, the gas spreads until, at t2, it reaches equilibrium. At 
this time, the box (A+B) is again at maximal entropy. As shown above, the thermodynamic entropy 
for the system (A + B) increases by: 
ΔS = nR ln (2) 
 
Using Boltzmann’s combinatorial method, this is explained by considering the accessible 
microstates of the gas. The phase-space of the system can be divided into small cells of volume v, 
where v << V. Consider the number of possible arrangements of the gas before time t1, when 
confined to side A of volume VA. Let WA = number of arrangements of N molecules in m = (V/v) cells. 
From above, we can calculate the multiplicity: 






 => SA  = kB ln WA 











After the barrier is removed at time t1, the accessible arrangements increases: 






 => SA  = kB ln WA+B 












= N kB ln (
𝑉
𝑣
) +  N kB ln(2) 
= 𝑆𝐴 +  N kB ln(2) 
 ∴ ΔS      = nR ln (2) 
 
This recovers the thermodynamic result. If we start the experiment with both sides containing 
equal numbers of molecules, the additive property of entropy is demonstrated, thus: 
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 𝑊𝐴+𝐵    = 𝑊𝐴 𝑊𝐵 











 => SA  = kB ln WA+B 











= N kB ln (
𝑉
𝑣




= 𝑆𝐴 +  𝑆𝐵 
 
13.11 PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 
We can use phase-space volumes to calculate the probability (and thus, the approximate time) of a 
system returning to a particular state. Consider a box with a dilute gas, comprising N molecules. 
Assume these molecules are fully described by their position and momentum in 3 dimensions. Each 
molecule thus has 6 degrees of freedom and the system has 6N degrees of freedom. Such a system is 
represented in a 6N-dimensional phase-space. 
 
If there was only one molecule in the box, what is the probability of finding that molecule in, say, 
the left side of the box? This simple case means we can focus only on 1 degree of freedom, the 
position along the x-axis, qx. There are 2 possible distributions: molecule found either in left side or 
right side of box. So, the probability of finding the molecule in the left side of box: 
P(qx(1) = left) = ½ 
 
For N = 10 molecules, there are N + 1 = 11 distinct distributions (or, macrostates). In one of these 
macrostates, all 10 molecules are on the left side. There is only 1 arrangement associated with that 
macrostate. Many more arrangements are associated with other macrostates. For this system of 10 
identical molecules, there are WAll = 2N = 210 = 1024 different possible arrangements. So, the 
probability of finding all molecules in the left side of the box: 
P(qx(1…10) = left)  =  2−10 
 
On the other hand, using the multiplicity formula: 
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WN,n = N!/n!(N-n)! 
 
The number of microstates associated with finding an even distribution is:  
W10,5 = 10!/5!(10-5)! = 252 
 
So, the probability of finding the molecules evenly distributed is: 
P(qx(1…5) = left) = W10,5 / WAll = 252 / 1024 ≃ 0.25 
 
This probability of finding an approximately even distribution quickly approaches certainty as the 
number of molecules increases. For instance, for N = 30: 
WAll = 2N = 230 ≃ 109 
W30,15 = 30!/15! 15! ≃ 1.55 x 108 
W30,14 = 30!/14! 16! ≃ 1.45 x 108 
W30,16 = 30!/16! 14! ≃ 1.45 x 108 
P(qx(15+/-1) = left) = 0.445 
 
For larger numbers, we can use Stirling’s approximation: 







For N = 100: 
WAll = 2N = 2100 ≃ 1030 
W100,50 = 100!/50! 50! ≃ 1029 
W100,49 = 100!/49! 51! ≃ 1029 
P(qx(50+/-5) = left) ≃ 1 
 
For N molecules, the probability of finding all molecules in the left side of the box: 
P(qx(1…N) = left) =  2−𝑁  
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So, if N is of order of Avagadro’s number, then: 








13.12 BLACK HOLE ENTROPY CALCULATIONS 
By estimating the number and average size of black holes in the universe, the total entropy of the 
universe can be approximated. Below is a very rough calculation. 
From Hubble constant measurements: 
H0 = 70 km s-1 Mpc-1 
 
So, critical density, ρ0, today is: 
ρ0 = 3H02/8πG 
    = 10-26 kg m3 
 
For the observable universe of age 14 billion years, its comoving radius, r = 50 billion light years. 
So, its volume, V = 4/3 πr3 = 1080 m3. And its mass, m = ρ0V = 1054 kg. If all this mass is in a black 
hole, then we can calculate the entropy, S: 
S = 8kGπ2m2/hc 
  = 10101 J/K (or 10124 kB) 
 
Calculation of the entropy of the early universe (around the time of decoupling) can be 
approximated by measurements of the CMB. Roughly, at the time of recombination, the radius, r = 
1022 m. So, the volume, V = 1066 m3. The temperature at the time of recombination, T = 103 K. The 
approximate entropy density, s, of CMB photons is proportional to T3. So, the entropy at 
recombination: 
S = 1075 
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13.13 QUANTUM MECHANICS 
It has been noted that quantum mechanics may obviate the need for the classical probabilities used 
so far. At first blush, quantum mechanics seems to offer a simple solution to the time-reversible 
nature of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics: it appears to be inherently irreversible. A 
measurement imposes wave function collapse, destroying any information about the wave function 
beforehand. The system is irremediably changed. There is no notion of a reverse trajectory for such 
dynamics. However, this summary assumes that collapse is part and parcel of quantum mechanics. 
Any cursory reading of the quantum mechanics literature reveals that this is one of many 
interpretations. Other interpretations have no use for collapse. Indeed, under the standard 
interpretation, collapse only leads to paradox. Bohmian mechanics, for instance, does not employ 
actual collapse. Neither does the recently popular Many-Worlds interpretation. So, the arguments 
thus put forward for classical statistical mechanics stand. There are, though, interpretations that 
offer irreversibility via collapse, that may have some legs to stand on. Notably, the GRW 
interpretation (more properly, GRW theory, as it makes predictions that differ from standard 
quantum mechanics) employs collapse that may obviate the need for the Past Hypothesis. 
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